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INTRODUCTION
From the Great Depression to the Great Recession, financial market crises have often been accompanied by complex phenomena1 that
authorities fail to account for due, in certain instances, to the ostensible simplicity of such phenomena. Take, for example, the interest
rate, a fundamental yet simplistic concept in finance. Private banks
employ interest rates to account for and assess borrower risk of default.2 By controlling the supply of money, central banks attempt to
influence interest rates to counter inflation or spur economic
growth.3
Simplicity notwithstanding, certain critical interest rates, such as
the lesser-known “reference” or “benchmark” rates, should not be
overlooked. At essence, these rates serve to convey information about
some aspect of the financial markets. The most prominent of the numerous reference rates4 is the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), a benchmark estimate of the cost of short-term borrowing for
large banks situated in London.5 Though Libor is currently undergo1
See Joe Nocera, A Wall Street Invention that Let the Crisis Mutate, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
2010, at B1 (noting the “introduction of [the] synthetic [collateralized debt obligation]” as
a vehicle for Wall Street and market participants to conduct innovative financial transactions such as “short[ing] the subprime market” and “mak[ing] an infinite number of bets
on the [subprime loans] that already existed”). Financial innovation plays a disproportionate role in such market phenomena. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs and Abacus 2007-AC1: A Look
Beyond the Numbers, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 28, 2010), http://knowledge.wharton.
upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2481 (describing the complex Abacus 2007-AC1 instrument, a synthetic collateralized debt obligation created by Goldman Sachs); see also WORLD
ECON. FORUM, RETHINKING FINANCIAL INNOVATION: REDUCING NEGATIVE OUTCOMES WHILE
RETAINING THE BENEFITS 24–31 (2012), available at http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_
FS_RethinkingFinancialInnovation_Report_2012.pdf (discussing financial innovation’s
role in the financial crisis of 2008).
2
See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF
THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 431, 464 (George M. Constantinides et al.
eds., 2003) (“If banks compete actively for loans, the rate they charge initially will reflect
average credit quality . . . .”).
3
See Sarwat Jahan, Inflation Targeting: Holding the Line, INT’L MONETARY FUND, http://
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/target.htm (last updated Mar. 28, 2012); see
also A. James Meigs & William Wolman, Central Banks and the Money Supply, FED. RES. BANK
ST. LOUIS, Aug. 1971, at 18, 18–19 (explaining how monetarist economists believe money
supply can control inflation); Andreas Schabert, Money Supply and the Implementation of Interest Rate Targets 13–18 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 483, 2005), available at
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecbwp483.pdf (examining the relationship between
money supply and interest rates).
4
See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: FINAL REPORT 54–55
(2012), available at http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_
280912.pdf (detailing many other lesser-known benchmark rates and defining the term
“benchmark rate”).
5
See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 76 (8th ed. 2011); see
also infra Part I.A.2 (noting that Libor is designed fundamentally to portray accurately the
borrowing costs for major banks and depository institutions in the financial markets). Cost
of short-term borrowing for an entity often serves as a proxy for the general credit condition and financial health of that entity.
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ing reform,6 traditionally leading London banks which are members
of the British Bankers’ Association (BBA) calculate it daily using estimates of these banks’ borrowing rates.7 Because Libor is such a convenient measure of baseline borrowing cost in the marketplace, it is
used, or “indexed,”8 by trillions of dollars’ worth of financial instruments,9 including many derivatives.10
Libor provides a paradigmatic example of an overlooked, but
enormously influential, innovative financial phenomenon. Derived
from humble beginnings,11 Libor was quickly formalized by the BBA
and gained widespread acceptance in modern markets. Legal intervention was virtually nonexistent. Unfortunately, this financial cornerstone, whose integrity was and is still central to the continued
systemic stability of global markets, fell prey to scandal. In early- to
mid-2008, whispers of Libor’s inaccuracy erupted into outright doubt
after a Wall Street Journal article catalyzed markets by reporting that
“[m]ajor banks [we]re contributing to the erratic behavior of a crucial
global lending benchmark” by “reporting significantly lower borrow-

6

See infra note 15.
The BBA, a trade association of the world’s largest banks, used to independently
calculated Libor. However, the BBA ceded Libor-setting authority following the manipulation scandal involving Barclays and other member banks. See infra Part I.B; see also infra
Part I.A.1 (providing a detailed description of how Libor is set).
8
For example, a bank wishing to raise short-term debt financing may offer to the
public medium-term notes with annual interest at the current Libor rate plus two percent.
In this manner, the notes reference Libor as the floating rate.
9
See Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Libor’s Rise May Sock Many Borrowers, WALL ST. J., Apr.
19–20, 2008, at B1; Julia Werdigier, British Banker Group to Strengthen Libor Oversight, N.Y.
TIMES, May 31, 2008, at C2. Approximately seventy-five percent of major U.S. cities employ
debt instruments indexed to Libor. Nathaniel Popper, Rate Scandal Stirs Scramble for Damages, DEALB%K (July 10, 2012, 9:28 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/10/liborrate-rigging-scandal-sets-off-legal-fights-for-restitution/. Just before the financial crisis, approximately ninety percent of all subprime mortgages issued in Ohio were indexed to Libor. Mark Schweitzer & Guhan Venkatu, Adjustable-Rate Mortgages and the Libor Surprise,
FED. RESERVE BANK CLEVELAND (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/
commentary/2009/012109.cfm.
10
Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange Act, as Amended, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions at 6, In
re Barclays PLC, CFTC Docket No. 12-25 (filed June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Settlement
Order] (“LIBOR also affects businesses seeking credit, consumers obtaining mortgages or
personal loans, and market participants transacting in numerous other financial contracts
in the U.S. and abroad that are based on the benchmark interest rates.”). To be clear, a
derivative instrument is a financial contract whose value in the marketplace stems formulaically from some other instrument—another derivative, an asset of value, a commodity, a
security regulated by the SEC, and countless others. See MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 14.01[A] (4th ed. Supp. 2013).
11
See infra Part I.A.1.
7
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ing costs for . . . Libor.”12 After similar articles were published,13 the
BBA, followed closely by regulators, engaged in its own investigation
of potential manipulation.14
Given Libor’s worldwide significance, the United States should
have a certain threshold level of oversight over the rate to prevent
future rate rigging.15 Though private litigants can engage in fullhearted litigation, agency action is essential for holistic enforcement
against rate rigging. What is not certain, however, is the extent to
which U.S. authorities, namely the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), may enforce U.S. antifraud and antimanipulation
laws against overseas banks for submitting false rates to the London
12
Carrick Mollenkamp & Mark Whitehouse, Study Casts Doubt on Key Rate, WALL ST. J.,
May 29, 2008, at A1; see DAVID M. ELLIS, FTI CONSULTING, LIBOR MANIPULATION: A BRIEF
OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATE 1 (2011), available at http://www.fticonsulting.com/global2/media/collateral/united-states/libor-manipulation.pdf (“[I]f LIBOR rates are being distorted
or manipulated in any way, the ramifications extend to nearly every corner of the global
money markets and to participants in many sectors of the global economy . . . .”); Carrick
Mollenkamp, Bankers Cast Doubt on Key Rate Amid Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at A1
(noting that “[o]ne of the most important barometers of the world’s financial health could
be sending false signals” due to manipulation); James Surowiecki, Bankers Gone Wild, NEW
YORKER, July 30, 2012, at 25, 25; Ben Protess & Mark Scott, After Barclays Scandal, Regulators
Say Rates Remain Flawed, DEALB%K (July 17, 2012, 2:32 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/07/17/after-barclays-scandal-regulators-say-rates-remain-flawed/ (“[Barclays] was accused of reporting false rates [to the BBA] that both bolstered its profits and projected an
overly rosy image of its health during the financial crisis.”). For a comprehensive discussion of the Barclays manipulation scandal as well as ensuing enforcement actions and regulatory reform, see infra Part I.B.
13
See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Laurence Norman, Under Watch, Libor Rises, WALL
ST. J., May 30, 2008, at C2. Queries into whether Libor was being manipulated were not
limited to the newspapers; academics also engaged in similar analyses. See, e.g., Rosa M.
Abrantes-Metz et al., Libor Manipulation?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 136, 140–49 (2012).
14
See Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Fed. Antitrust Laws at 12–14, Green
Pond Rd. Assocs., LLC v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 12-CV-5822 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 30, 2012).
15
U.K. authorities, namely the Financial Services Authority, are set to wrest control of
Libor calculation out of the BBA’s hands. Mark Scott, British Bankers Group May Give Up
Control over Libor, DEALB%K (Sept. 25, 2012, 1:11 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2012/09/25/british-bankers-group-seen-losing-control-over-libor/. The European Union
has also engaged in broad investigations of the rate-rigging scandal, the results of which
may lead to “stricter curbs for financial benchmarks.” John O’Donnell, EU Prepares for
Clampdown on Libor-Style Indexes, REUTERS, Sept. 5, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.
com/article/2012/09/05/us-eu-libor-law-idUSBRE8840H920120905; see Jennifer Ryan,
Central Bankers Meet in Basel as King Leads Libor Talks, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 10, 2012, 6:29 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-08/king-to-lead-central-bankers-seeking-solu
tion-to-libor-damage.html (“[T]he European Union has also pledged tougher supervision
of Libor, Euribor and other market indices. It’s weighing options such as forcing banks to
provide real transaction data rather than estimates and increasing the number of lenders
involved in the rate setting.”). In addition, “Bank of England Governor Mervyn King
has . . . called for ‘radical reforms’ of Libor.” O’Donnell, supra. Central bankers from
around the world have joined other Libor investigations after an inquiry into Libor rigging. Ryan, supra. Speed in regulation is critical at this juncture; as CFTC Chairman Gary
Gensler pointed out, Libor is “still vulnerable to manipulation” because when banks do not
lend to each other, “the lack of real transactions underpinning [Libor leaves] it open to
tampering.” Scott, supra.
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organization responsible for calculating Libor. While legislators and
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic—including the U.K. Financial
Services Authority (FSA) and the U.S. Federal Reserve—engaged in
their own investigatory proceedings following the scandal,16 various
private parties, many situated in the United States, hurled lawsuits
against Libor-setting banks.17 And the investigation continues: many
banks currently not implicated are expected to be caught in the
scandal.18
The CFTC, in addition to spearheading global regulatory investigative efforts, also engaged in its own investigation against Barclays,
one of the first Libor-setting banks embroiled in the scandal, for attempted manipulation and fraud.19 Ultimately, Barclays offered to
settle, and the CFTC accepted, culminating in what would become the
largest settlement order the agency has ever agreed to.20 In closing
the settlement offer, Barclays agreed to admit that executives had
16
Barclays recently settled an enforcement action brought by the CFTC for $200 million. Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 1. Barclays and the Royal Bank of Scotland also
face potentially crippling lawsuits with “billions of pounds of claims.” Alistair Osborne,
Banks Face Crippling Libor Litigation Costs, TELEGRAPH (June 28, 2012, 7:34 PM), http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/9363260/Banks-face-cripplingLibor-litigation-costs.html; see also David Keohane, Some More Big Scary Libor Risk Numbers to
Digest, FTALPHAVILLE (July 12, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2012/07/12/
1081181/some-more-big-scary-libor-risk-numbers-to-digest/ (detailing a study from Morgan Stanley analysts covering the potential costs of the Libor manipulation to Barclays and
other banks). Costs to other stakeholders such as municipalities are difficult to measure
because of the inherent ambiguity in determining damages in a Libor-manipulation suit.
See Popper, supra note 9 (“The efforts to calculate potential losses are complicated by the
fact that Libor is used to determine the cost of thousands of financial products around the
globe each day. If Libor was artificially pushed down on a particular day, it would help
people involved in some types of contracts and hurt people involved in others.”).
17
For example, the city of Baltimore filed one of the first private suits against Barclays, claiming that the rate rigging caused many of the city’s Libor-indexed investments to
sour due to the low rates Barclays attempted to set. See In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB, 2012 WL 1522306 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 2012).
Various Barclays shareholders filed another class action suit last year, alleging damages
stemming from Libor manipulation, among other things; the case is still pending in the
Southern District of New York. Gusinsky v. Barclays PLC, No. 12-CV-5329, 2012 WL
2775017 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2012). This is the first class action suit brought by private
litigants since the enforcement actions by the FSA and CFTC.
18
For example, Royal Bank of Scotland said it would “probably face financial penalties connected to . . . rate-rigging” as it joins the ranks of implicated Libor-setting banks.
Mark Scott, R.B.S. Expects Fine over Libor Investigation, DEALB%K (Nov. 2, 2012, 5:13 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/r-b-s-expects-libor-fine-amid-third-quarterloss/.
19
See Ben Protess, Libor Case Energizes a Wall Street Watchdog, DEALB%K (Aug. 12, 2012,
8:57 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/libor-case-energizes-gensler-andthe-c-f-t-c/.
20
Settlement Order, supra note 10; see Press Release, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor Benchmark Interest Rates
(June 27, 2012), available at http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289-12; infra Part I.B.2.

R

R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-5\CRN506.txt

1276

unknown

Seq: 6

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

20-JUN-13

14:19

[Vol. 98:1271

tried to manipulate Libor.21 Had the bank chosen to litigate rather
than settle, however, the CFTC would have faced formidable legal
obstacles.
First, the CFTC might not have withstood jurisdictional challenges. After all, Libor is not specifically defined in the Commodity
Exchange Act (CEA), the CFTC’s operative statute;22 additionally,
Barclays and other Libor-setting banks are situated primarily in
London,23 where Libor’s calculation and dissemination actually occurs. Further, Libor-setting banks report to U.K. organizations and
authorities in calculating Libor.24 Second, even assuming that the
CFTC could overcome these jurisdictional challenges, the agency
might not have a legitimate cause of action under the CEA sufficient
to surpass a motion to dismiss. As I describe later, it is unclear just
how broadly the CEA covers rate rigging, both on an extraterritorial
basis and on substantive grounds.25 Moreover, the traditional extraterritoriality tests for subject-matter jurisdiction under the CEA are in
a state of flux after the Supreme Court’s recent pronouncement in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.,26 which abrogated the traditional tests in the securities realm and established that extraterritoriality is a question of jurisdiction and substantive statutory reach—
otherwise known as substantive statutory merit.27 The conclusion,
then, is quite clear: contemporary statutory and regulatory regimes
are inadequate to effectively capture reference rates and holistically enforce against their manipulation.28
Ultimately, Barclays is just the tip of the iceberg. To ensure
preparedness against future manipulations of and fraud in connection with reference rates, the CFTC must establish a holistic enforcement regime and avoid piecemeal litigation in enforcing against rate
rigging. In so doing, the Commission must consider a trio of issues:
subject-matter jurisdiction, substantive statutory merit, and the claim
itself. Part I of this Note begins this discussion by first describing Libor—its history and modern calculation—and then examining the
Barclays case. Part II initiates a descriptive survey of the limits—both
jurisdictional and substantive—of CFTC enforcement authority and
capability in the Libor rate-rigging context and concludes with an ar21
Jean Eaglesham et al., Traders’ Messages Providing Grist to Regulators for Investigation,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 2012, at C1.
22
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of the difficulties associated with fitting Libor
into the CEA’s framework.
23
See Appendix A: Statement of Facts at 4, In re Barclays, CFTC Docket No. 12-25
(filed June 27, 2012) [hereinafter Statement of Facts].
24
See Press Release, supra note 20.
25
See infra Part II.A.1–2.
26
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
27
See infra Part II.B.
28
See infra Part II.C.
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gument for a holistic approach to enforcement. Current case law and
statutory frameworks do not clearly permit the CFTC to reach rate
rigging extraterritorially as a matter of substantive merit and subjectmatter jurisdiction. In addition, once these two hurdles have been
surpassed, the CFTC must still face off against the difficulties inherent
in proving a Libor fraud or manipulation case, complicated by Libor’s
defiance against classification within existing case precedent. Part III
outlines a two-part plan to engage the CFTC in active oversight and
enforcement of Libor. The plan addresses the jurisdictional and substantive merit questions by reintroducing the conduct and effects
tests29 for extraterritorial commodities law and the substantive case
question by advocating for the insertion of Libor as a commodity in
the CEA followed by reference-rate rulemaking.
I
UBIQUITOUS, SCANDALOUS LIBOR
A. History and Anatomy of Libor
1. Inception
Libor dates back to 1969, when the London branch of Manufacturer’s Hanover Bank organized an $80 million syndicated loan30 for
the Shah of Iran pegged to an interbank offered interest rate based in
London.31 The boom of the global loan market and the creation of
the Eurodollar in the 1960s paved the way for Libor’s broad use as a
benchmark rate for various instruments to reference.32 As growth in
syndicated loans exploded due in part to new regulations that capped
the amount of credit risk any individual bank could carry at a given
time, a group of “big reference banks within each syndicate” began
reporting their funding rate—at weighted average—which changed
on a set periodic basis to reflect market conditions.33 The headmaster
of this reporting, Minos Zombanakis, called this new rate the London
Interbank Offer Rate, or Libor.34
29

See infra notes 146, 148 and accompanying text.
The term “syndicated loan” describes a standard loan or credit line provided not by
one lender but by a group of lenders, and which is structured and executed by one or
several financial institutions—mainly banks. STANDARD & POOR’S, A GUIDE TO THE LOAN
MARKET 7 (2011), available at https://www.lcdcomps.com/d/pdf/LoanMarketGuide.pdf.
Syndicated loans are still prevalent today and frequently employ Libor as the reference
interest rate. Id.
31
Kirstin Ridley & Huw Jones, Libor’s Troubled History Features the Shah, Greece and Scandal, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2012, 5:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
08/08/libor-history_n_1754745.html.
32
Id.
33
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
34
Id.
30

R
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Calculation of this initial rate roughly employed the same
formula used today, whereby all members of the syndicate submitted
their funding costs and the highest and lowest rates were discarded to
prevent skew.35 Incentive to manipulate early Libor was low for two
reasons: first, since banks were lending money at these rates rather
than borrowing, “there was no incentive to low-ball rates”; second,
banks were subject to ejection from the syndicate if they submitted an
unreasonable rate.36 As the credit markets surged in growth and new
derivative instruments blossomed, the BBA intervened in 1986 to consolidate, formalize, and make transparent the rate-setting process for
the global credit markets, creating the modern Libor. Through a
snowball effect, “Libor became a benchmark for trillions of dollars
worth of derivatives,” with traders all over the world “watching and
dissecting what rates people had been putting in each day, looking for
a major change in behaviour.”37
2. Methodology
As noted in the previous section, Libor gained prominence after
its adoption by the BBA as a benchmark rate representing interbank
borrowing costs. The following section details how rate setting occurred prior to the relinquishment of control over Libor by the BBA
following the rate-rigging scandal. Though the BBA no longer plays a
role in Libor setting, the new process—which as of this writing is still
in development—will likely look very similar to the discarded one.38
35

Id.; see infra Part I.A.2.
Ridley & Jones, supra note 31.
37
Id.
38
See Brooke Masters, Libor Reform to Become Law Next Year, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012,
7:16 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/99fcf516-0984-11e2-a5a9-00144feabdc0.html#
axzz2AEEI21FX; Harry Wilson, Libor Reform Is “First Step” to City Overhaul, TELEGRAPH (Sept.
28, 2012, 5:25 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scandal/9574676/Liborreform-is-first-step-to-City-overhaul.html. Indeed, many commentators view current reform
proposals to be insufficient because they address only the issue of manipulation, not the
deeper problem the Libor structure imposes. See, e.g., Karen Brettell, Libor Reform May Add
Volatility, Increase Some Funding Costs, REUTERS, Sept. 28 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/09/28/us-markets-money-idUSBRE88R1C720120928; Tim Worstall, The Libor Reform that Doesn’t Reform Libor Enough, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2012, 11:34 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/09/30/the-libor-reform-that-doesntreform-libor-enough/.
In a speech given late last year, FSA head of conduct Martin Wheatley outlined the
basic points around which the reform effort centered. Libor Reform: Main Points in Martin
Wheatley’s Review, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 28, 2012, 7:07 AM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/libor-scandal/9572778/Libor-reform-Main-points-in-Martin-Wheatleys-review.html.
Among other things, Wheatley emphasized the need for greater governmental administration in the setting of Libor, noted the delicate task of finding a new administrator to replace the BBA, and argued for increased external oversight of the rate-setting process. Id.
Nowhere among the proposals was any indication that there would be significant alteration
of the calculation method itself. Reform efforts have also failed to review the quality of
submissions. In rough market conditions, where banks are simply refusing to lend to each
36
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The BBA, with its over 200 member banks, defines Libor as “[t]he
rate at which an individual contributor panel bank could borrow
funds [on an unsecured basis], were it to do so by asking for and then
accepting interbank offers in reasonable market size, just prior to
11.00am London time.”39 Included in over $10 trillion of loans and
$350 trillion of swap derivatives,40 Libor is set each day for ten currencies,41 with fifteen maturities quoted for each.42 All rates are submitted between 11:00 AM and 11:10 AM London time and disseminated
to the public by 12:00 PM London time each day.43
The BBA’s Libor-setting capacity comprises a number of Contributor Panels, one for each currency quoted, for a total of ten Panels;
each Panel consists of BBA-approved banks that trade in the London
market.44 For example, the Panel for U.S. dollar Libor in 2010 conother, should Libor submissions still be based on actual market transactions or on modeled
predictions? See Worstall, supra. Reform legislation is now making its way through the
British Parliament, with “evolution rather than revolution” in mind. Huw Jones, UK Faces
Balancing Act with Libor Reform Proposals, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/09/26/us-britain-fsa-libor-idUSBRE88P0EV20120926.
This Note will not delve into the details of reforming Libor’s rate-setting structure, as
it is beyond the scope of domestic regulatory jurisdiction to enforce against rigging of the
structure in place—whatever that may ultimately be. For a comprehensive outline of reform targets, see generally THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, passim.
39
Definitions, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.com/bbalibor-explained/definitions
(last visited Apr. 10, 2013); see Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 1. In soliciting quotes,
the BBA poses the following question to each Contributor Panel bank: “At what rate could
you borrow funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting inter-bank offers in a
reasonable market size just prior to 11 am?” The Basics, BBALIBOR, http://www.bbalibor.
com/bbalibor-explained/the-basics (last visited Apr. 10, 2013). However, current reform
efforts in the United Kingdom have trended toward requiring Libor submissions to be
based on real transactions. THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 35–36.
40
Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Diagnosing the LIBOR: Strategic Manipulation
and Member Portfolio Positions 2 (Dec. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.econ.umn.edu/~bajari/undergradiosp10/LiborManipulation.pdf. Compare
this $350 trillion figure to the total “volume” of interest rate derivatives (the most popular
form of swap derivative by a wide margin) outstanding in the second half of 2009: $450
trillion. See Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 1.
41
The ten currencies are the Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, the Danish
krone, the euro, the New Zealand dollar, the U.K. pound sterling, the Swedish krona, the
Swiss franc, the U.S. dollar, and the Japanese yen. Of these ten, the most highly watched
are the pound, the U.S. dollar, the euro, and the yen. BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BBA LIBOR—STRENGTHENING FOR THE
FUTURE § 3.4 (2008).
42
The Basics, supra note 39.
43
Id.
44
See id.; Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 1–2; see also Panels, BBALIBOR, http://
www.bbalibor.com/panels (last visited Apr. 10, 2013) (providing lists of contributor banks
for each Panel). The BBA principally selects the banks to participate in each Panel, and
the Foreign Exchange and Money Markets Committee reviews the panel selection biannually. See BBA Libor Panels, BBALIBOR (June 10, 2010), http://www.bbalibor.com/newsreleases/bba-libor-panels1. The BBA follows three guiding principles in selecting banks
for currency Panels: (1) scale of market activity, (2) credit rating, and (3) perceived expertise in the currency concerned. The Basics, supra note 39.
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sisted of sixteen banks, including Barclays (which was also a member
of the yen and sterling Panels).45 After Panel banks make submissions, the BBA ranks them for each currency and maturity, excludes
the highest and lowest quartiles, and averages the resulting rates to
arrive at that day’s Libor “fix,” or rate.46 The BBA uses this methodology to prevent bias in the final estimate from outlier submissions. According to the BBA, the basis for each submission must be supported
by employees responsible for cash management without influence
from other bank divisions such as derivatives trading desks, and it
should not be derived in any manner from the pricing of any derivative instrument.47
Though Libor was initially used as an indicator of the lowest borrowing cost a Panel bank48 could achieve, its use has expanded beyond this strict interpretation. Now, market participants and others
use Libor as a floating rate of payment in standard derivative and loan
documentation as well as certain retail products such as mortgages
and college loans.49 Libor’s prominence in derivatives markets50 gives
way to clear moral hazard issues because those banks contributing to
each day’s fix have derivatives and securities positions that may result
in profits or losses depending on Libor’s movements over time.51 Further, given that Libor’s fixes are attributed to Panel bank factors such
as liquidity access and credit risk, perceptions of Libor movements—
45

Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 3.
Id. at 1–2.
47
Id. at 2–3.
48
The Panel banks supposedly act as proxies for creditworthy, well-capitalized, and
liquid banks. See, e.g., BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, supra note 41, at 1 (“LIBOR panel
banks . . . are invariably those with the best credit ratings . . . .”); INT’L MONETARY FUND,
FINANCIAL STRESS AND DELEVERAGING: MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 74 (2008),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf (“LIBOR . . . rates remain worthwhile as measures of a typical creditworthy bank’s marginal
cost of unsecured term funds in the wholesale money market . . . .”).
49
The Basics, supra note 39.
50
Reference rates, though incredibly useful for ease of exposure hedging and market
liquidity, can gather inertia such that alternative rates, which may be more accurate or
precise, are ignored for the sake of familiarity. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at
45–46.
51
Indeed, this is the exact scenario that Barclays admitted to in its settlement order
with the CFTC. See Press Release, supra note 20. Also, structural market characteristics
buttress the moral hazard concerns. The Eurodollar futures contract, which is priced to
Libor, began trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange in 1997, notwithstanding industry concerns that many of the Libor-setting banks would have positions in these Eurodollar
contracts. Larry Doyle, Libor Scandal Update: More Evidence from Mid-1990s, BUSINESS INSIDER
(Nov. 21, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/libor-scandal-update-moreevidence-from-mid-1990s-2012-11 (“If [U.S. regulators] approved a Chicago Mercantile Exchange plan to [price Eurodollars to Libor], they would put at risk the integrity of a key
interest rate in the global financial system.”); see Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Special Report:
How Gaming Libor Became Business as Usual, REUTERS, Nov. 20, 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/11/20/us-libor-fixing-origins-idUSBRE8AJ0MH20121120.
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even if incorrect or untethered to economic foundation—can easily
chip away at the integrity of the rate.52
During the period leading up to and after the recent financial
crisis, “numerous sources in the financial markets” called into question Libor’s integrity due to perceived problems with large-bank balance-sheet liquidity.53 Though the BBA, denying that cracks in
Libor’s foundation existed, undertook an extensive study54 examining
the concerns raised, both public news sources as well as trader circles
ruminated on Libor’s accuracy, leading to the “breakdown of longstanding correlations.”55 After the financial crisis, Libor received a
massive blow because London banks simply were not and are still not
lending to each other.56 Without such transactions, these banks have
no real numbers to base their Libor submissions on, and so they must
estimate hypothetical numbers as if the interbank market were thriving. While this development carries significant implications for Libor’s reform, it also brings to bear a particular line of argument
against accusations of rate rigging: that any abnormal rate submissions
are not products of attempted manipulation or fraud but of interbank
credit conditions.57
B. The Rate-Rigging Scandal
After the Wall Street Journal spurred investigations into the rigging
of various reference rates (including Libor),58 numerous Libor-setting
banks came forward to deal with the charges levied against them.59
52
For example, in mid-2008, the market expressed distrust for current Libor fixes
because it believed the Panel banks had an incentive not to report their actual borrowing
costs due to financial weaknesses on their books. Adam Bradbery, Libor Revamp Is Urged by
Money-Market Group, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2008, at C2.
53
Justin T. Wong, Note, LIBOR Left in Limbo; A Call for More Reform, 13 N.C. BANKING
INST. 365, 369 (2009).
54
See generally BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, supra note 41, passim (discussing the stability
and integrity of Libor-fixing methodology).
55
See generally Wong, supra note 53, at 369–72 (citing BRITISH BANKERS’ ASS’N, supra
note 41, §§ 2.3–.4, 11.1) (examining the “indicators” circulated by market participants
questioning the validity of Libor during this time period).
56
See, e.g., infra note 107.
57
See infra Part II.A (fleshing out this argument).
58
See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
59
UBS was the first bank to admit to Libor manipulation. Lindsay Fortado et al., UBS
Turning Whistleblower in Libor Probe Pressures Rivals, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 21, 2012, 5:43 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-21/ubs-turning-whistleblower-in-libor-probepressures-rivals.html. UBS AG, ICAP plc, Lloyds Banking Group plc, Deutsche Bank AG,
and some American banks also were, or are still being, subject to regulatory investigations
and probes. See Howard Mustoe, Barclays Tumbles as Libor Fine Sparks Lawsuit Speculation,
BLOOMBERG (June 28, 2012, 7:59 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-06-28/bar
clays-tumbles-as-libor-fine-sparks-lawsuit-speculation.html; Hugh Son, BofA Says Libor Probe
Draws U.S. Subpoenas on Submissions, BLOOMBERGBUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 3, 2012), http://www.
businessweek.com/news/2012-08-02/bofa-says-libor-probe-draws-u-dot-s-dot-subpoenas-onsubmissions.
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Private parties also filed countless lawsuits against the various banks,
each hoping to catch a piece of the restitution pie. Though there are
too many to name individually, the major cases were consolidated by
their respective claims, including an antitrust consolidation (including over-the-counter plaintiffs, bondholder plaintiffs, and others)60 as
well as other class actions.61 Private parties in the United Kingdom
have reportedly also been readying actions against certain U.K.
banks.62 To demonstrate how Libor manipulation and rigging occurs,
I use Barclays’s case because of the comparatively large amount of
available information on it. It is important to remember, however,
that future reference-rate manipulation cases may be starkly different
from Barclays’s case, both in depth of inculpatory evidence available
and in type of manipulation or fraud involved.
1. Barclays’s Misdeeds
At core, regulators alleged that Barclays engaged in three discrete
wrongdoings. The first involved intrabank conflict of interest:
namely, that the bank’s internal derivatives trading desk—occupied by
swaps traders—unlawfully influenced the bank’s London money markets desk—responsible for submitting quotes to the BBA—by encouraging the money-markets desk to make submissions that would benefit
the bank’s derivatives positions.63 Swaps traders made such requests
from roughly 2005 to 2009, and submitters accommodated such requests “on numerous occasions.”64 The undue influence typically occurred in this fashion:
[O]n December 19, 2006, a swaps trader located in New
York . . . sent an e-mail to [a London submitter] with the subject
line, “3m Libor,” asking, “Can you . . . [please] continue to go in for
3m[onth] Libor at 5.365[%] or lower, we [have positions that require lower three-month Libor].” . . . [The submitter] replied, “Will
do my best sir.” . . . On December 19, 20, and 21, 2006, Barclays’s 3month Dollar LIBOR submissions were 5.37%, 5.37%, and 5.375%,
respectively. . . . At approximately 1:03 p.m. [on December 21],
[the submitter] created an electronic calendar entry stating, “SET 3
MONTH US$ LIBOR LOW!!!!!!” . . . that was scheduled to begin on
60
In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 30, 2012).
61
For a list of all outstanding private litigation involving the Libor manipulation, see
Presentation by Brian P. Murray, Murray Frank LLP, LIBOR Manipulation Litigation: Latest Trends & Developments; Pursuing and Defending Individual and Class Action LiborRelated Actions 46–57 (Oct. 23, 2012), available at http://media.straffordpub.com/prod
ucts/libor-manipulation-litigation-latest-trends-and-developments-2012-10-23/presenta
tion.pdf.
62
See id. at 59.
63
See Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 6–11.
64
Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 5–6.
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December 22, 2006 . . . and continue until January 1, 2007 . . . . On
December 22, 2006 and the subsequent trading days . . . , Barclays’s
3-month Dollar LIBOR submissions were 5.36%, 5.365%, 5.35%,
and 5.36% . . . .65

It became clear to markets (and later to regulators) that these traders
were attempting to manipulate Barclays’s U.S. dollar and yen Libor
submissions to have a “favorable effect” on “trading positions,” which
would boost trader compensation—often tied to profits of the trading
books.66
The second major finding concerns attempted interbank collusion
to improperly influence Libor fixes: from roughly 2005 to at least
2008, swaps traders at various Panel banks attempted to convince each
others’ submitters to submit favorable Libor quotes—mostly for the
U.S. dollar and yen—to the BBA.67 The motive was simple: since each
Libor fix depends on the submissions of a number of Panel banks,
with half of the quotes cut anyway, more collusion meant more substantial results.68
The third and final finding arguably produces the greatest systemic concern: according to certain internal communications that surfaced during the CFTC’s investigation, Barclays’s management, in the
periods immediately preceding the crisis, attempted to make the
bank’s risk profile appear rosier than it actually was by encouraging
submitters to lower their Libor submissions to suppress Libor.69 Cer65
Id. at 7. The trader in the example had derivatives positions (tied to Libor) that
would presumably earn money when three-month Libor for U.S. dollars decreased below
5.635%, leading the trader to tell the submitter in London to submit low quotes for that
specific Libor maturity. And the submitter complied. This sort of submission does not
mean that three-month Libor for U.S. dollars will be 5.635%; but Barclays’s submission
could certainly reduce that number, producing an inaccurate borrowing cost rate. Other
requests would note that it was “very important that the [Libor fix] comes as high as possible” or that submitters should “go for LOW 6[-month] [Libor fix] today.” Id. at 7–8.
66
Id. at 9. The reason swaps traders cared so much about what a particular Libor
fixed at on any given trading day was the massive size of positions the traders held in
derivatives indexed to Libor. Typically, when a trader enters into a position (e.g., buying
interest rate swaps coupled with some other derivatives), that trader, taking into account
market conditions and other positions held, makes a bet on information, since usually one
can only guess where Libor will be in the next few days, weeks, or months in a tight range.
However, even small adverse movements in Libor—proving the trader’s information inaccurate—can have a “significant impact on the profitability of a trader’s trading portfolio.”
Id. For example, one Barclays trader, in some electronic messages to submitters, stated,
“[F]or every [0.0025%] tomorrows [sic] [Libor] fix is below 4.0525[%,] we lose 154,687.50
usd [United States dollars] . . . .” Id. (first, third, and sixth alterations in original). Thus, it
pays to move Libor in one’s favor.
67
See id. at 10–13 (providing some examples of these interbank communications and
requests).
68
In early 2007, one Barclays trader wrote to a trader at another Panel bank, stating:
“[T]his is the way you pull off deals like this[;] . . . the trick is you must not do this alone.”
Id. at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
69
Id. at 16–18.
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tain midlevel employees, concerned about the integrity of the rates
submitted, spoke quietly to British regulators, though none mentioned management’s directives.70
The fear attending this final revelation stems from the implications of management’s motive to obscure the entire bank’s financial
condition. From mid- to late-2007, Barclays, like many of its peers,
began suffering from liquidity problems due to decreased liquidity
supply in the money markets—where large banks go to refresh their
short-term capital necessary to conduct daily operations.71 Also like
its peers, Barclays began receiving negative press questioning Barclays’s financial condition because of its high Libor submissions; high
Libor generally meant higher borrowing costs, which in turn indicated that lenders attributed a higher risk of default to Barclays and
thus demanded higher interest to cover this risk.72 Barclays’s management believed that its peers were in similarly negative liquidity positions but were already reducing Libor quotes to fight the negative
publicity.73 Thus, management “improperly . . . [took] concerns
about negative publicity into account”; they were interested in using
the bank’s submissions themselves, not the resulting Libor fixes, to
bolster the public’s view of Barclays’s financial condition.74 In defense of their actions, some managers at Barclays alleged that officials
at the Bank of England indirectly instructed the bank to report lower
Libor numbers to allay market doubt of major banks’
creditworthiness.75
2. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s Response
Based on the three chief discoveries outlined above, the CFTC—
with aid from the U.S. Department of Justice and other government
70

Id. at 18–21.
See id. at 17–18.
72
See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 79–80 (“[A]lthough a bank’s daily LIBOR submission does not necessarily reflect increased counterparty risk, it may be interpreted by external observers as an indication of . . . creditworthiness . . . . During periods
of market stress there is . . . an incentive to lower submissions in order that perception of
that bank’s relative creditworthiness is not negatively affected.”).
73
See Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 19–20; THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4,
at 79–80. Recall that Libor submissions are public information. Assuming truthful reporting, a lower Libor submission means that the submitting bank has lower borrowing costs
and thus has relatively better credit and liquidity positions in the market (i.e., the bank is
healthier). The BBA in 2008 noted that “contributor banks may be exhibiting herd behavior in their submitted rates to avoid speculation and rumour mongering [regarding their
financial health].” See Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 19 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
74
Statement of Facts, supra note 23, at 18, 22.
75
See id. at 21–22.
71
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authorities76—brought an enforcement action under several provisions of the CEA77 broadly alleging that Barclays attempted to manipulate Libor and Euribor fixes to benefit their derivatives trading
positions and bolster public perception of their financial health.78
The Commission’s first allegation was a violation of section
9(a)(2) of the CEA, which prohibits any fraudulent communication
knowingly made “concerning crop or market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any commodity in interstate commerce.”79 By knowingly using impermissible factors80 in its
calculation of Libor quote submissions, the Commission argued, Barclays conveyed “false, misleading or knowingly inaccurate information” which “tends to affect the prices of commodities in interstate
commerce.”81
The next allegation concerned violations of sections 6(c), 6(d),
and 9(a)(2), which together prohibit attempted manipulation in the
commodities and futures markets. Section 9(a)(2), in relevant part,
deems unlawful any attempt to manipulate the price of a commodity or
futures contract in interstate commerce.82 Sections 6(c) and 6(d) are
more procedural in nature, providing the Commission with the authority to “serve a complaint” and impose, among other things, “civil
76
Other agencies that aided the CFTC in its investigation include the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, the FSA in London, the U.S. Justice Department, and the
Washington Field Office of the FBI. Press Release, supra note 20. The FSA, in its own
regulatory action, issued a Final Notice fining Barclays £59.5 million. See Barclays Bank Plc,
Final Notice, Reference No. 122702 (Fin. Servs. Auth. June 27, 2012). The Justice Department’s Fraud Division also entered into a nonprosecution agreement with Barclays under
which the bank agreed to pay $160 million in fines as well as implement various compliance and internal control measures. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank
PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate
and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27,
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/June/12-crm-815.html.
77
The CEA regulates the trading of futures and certain derivatives activity in the
United States and establishes the statutory framework through which the CFTC derives its
enforcement and regulatory authority. Pub. L. 107-8, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
78
Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 2–4. After accepting the settlement offer, pursuant to sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the CEA, the CFTC entered an official order documenting the investigation and ensuing settlement in which the agency established several
violations of the CEA—consented to by Barclays. See id. at 1.
79
7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2006). Several cases interpret this section, though predominantly in the natural gas and energy market context. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, 681
F.3d 678, 703–05 (5th Cir. 2012) (false reporting of natural gas trades); United States v.
Valencia, 394 F.3d 352, 354–57 (5th Cir. 2004) (manipulation of natural gas markets);
CFTC v. Johnson, 408 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266–67 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (injunction against engaging in trading in energy markets).
80
These factors include management’s wish to portray a stronger financial outlook to
the public as well as the derivatives positions on Barclays’s swaps books. See Settlement
Order, supra note 10, at 26.
81
Id.
82
7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2).
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monetary penalties and cease and desist orders” so long as the Commission “has reason to believe that any person . . . has manipulated or
attempted to manipulate the market price of any commodity [or future] . . . or has violated any of the provisions of [the CEA].”83 As
applied, the CFTC insists that Barclays intended to supply a “price”
that “did not reflect the legitimate forces of supply and demand.”84 A
major hurdle in this allegation is whether Libor itself can be considered the “price” of a commodity or derivative instrument,85 discussed
in depth in the next Part.86
The penultimate count captures the interbank activity: the CFTC
charged Barclays swaps traders with aiding and abetting manipulation
activities conducted by similarly situated traders at other Panel banks
in violation of section 13(a) of the CEA.87 And finally, to pursue the
bank itself rather than the individual swaps traders, the CFTC invoked
section 2(a)(1)(B) of the CEA and attendant Regulation 1.2, which
provide for respondeat superior liability.88
As mentioned, Barclays preempted any pending CFTC litigation
by settling. Such a swift and uncontroversial resolution to these otherwise contentious events is certainly a blessing, though it would be myopic to expect repeat performances in the future. The next Part
examines the difficulty of labeling Libor rigging under any of the
CEA’s enforcement provisions in the context of the Barclays fiasco
and advocates for a “holistic enforcement” regime for the CFTC.

IMPEDIMENTS

TO

II
DOMESTIC ENFORCEMENT

The detrimental effects of and urgency surrounding attempted
manipulation of and fraud concerning Libor are evident from the
83
See Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 26 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 9 (emphasis added)
(CEA section 6(c)) and 7 U.S.C. § 13b (CEA section 6(d))).
84
Id. at 27 (quoting Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, [1982–1984 Transfer Binder]
Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶¶ 21,796, 27,283 (Dec. 17, 1982)); see also United States v.
U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 445 (1978) (indicating that it would not be necessary to
prove that the accused knew his attempted manipulation would succeed, as long as the
accused “consciously desire[d] that result, whatever the likelihood of that result happening
from his conduct” (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 196
(1972))).
85
In financial vernacular, the term “price” is frequently used to describe the particular rate or rates a counterparty might pay in a given swap or other derivative transaction.
For example, in the common interest-rate swap, each counterparty pays either a fixed or
floating rate to the other and receives the opposite in return. Determination of these rates
is also called “pricing” the swap. See ANDREW M. CHISHOLM, DERIVATIVES DEMYSTIFIED
59–60, 62–63 (2010).
86
See infra Part II.A.1.
87
7 U.S.C. § 13c(a); Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 27.
88
7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2012); Settlement Order, supra note 10, at
28.
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Barclays scandal and from the numerous other allegations suggesting
the involvement of a host of other banks. To set the stage for the
discussion of how the Commission should involve itself going forward,
this Part describes how Libor manipulation may be anchored substantively and jurisdictionally in the CEA89 and addresses the impediments
facing the Commission in both regards. This Part also crafts a normative argument for why an ad hoc approach is inadequate to suppress
future problems.
A. Substantive Routes: Antimanipulation and Antifraud
1. Attempted Manipulation
The CEA, a remedial statute, ferrets out manipulation and fraud,
“distinguishable on the basis of how they affect other [market participants].”90 The statute never defines manipulation; instead, a gargantuan body of case law and commentary has coalesced around this gap
in the context of futures markets.91 Not surprisingly, the most probable avenues for finding statutory manipulation of Libor were set forth
by the Commission in its settlement order against Barclays.92 Together, those provisions permit the Commission to go after “persons”
who exercise the requisite market power to attempt to manipulate
“commodity prices” to effect artificial prices.93 The “price” of a commodity is the price at which one may buy some unit of the commodity
immediately.94
89
The Barclays investigation partially unveiled the scope of the CFTC’s enforcement
in the face of manipulation in the marketplace. See Protess, supra note 19 (pointing out
that the once “toothless agency” has now been “thrust . . . into the spotlight,” with “Wall
Street . . . taking the [C]ommission more seriously” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
90
3 PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION 1232
(4th ed. 2004). The driver of this distinction lies in the fact that for every derivative, there
are two parties holding opposite positions. One party’s gain is exactly inversely proportional to the other party’s loss. Thus, “the gain . . . of a market manipulation is shared by
the manipulator with all other persons on the same side of the market.” Id. (emphasis added).
For example, a trader who manipulates the futures market for grain invariably will cause
the futures price for grain—which is the same for everyone in that market—to move up or
down, whichever way benefits that trader. If the grain trader causes the market price to
shift up, then all other traders holding the manipulator’s position will benefit unwittingly.
Id. The fraudster, however, receives benefits from targeting individual market participants,
not the market itself, and thus keeps all of the “fruits of the fraud.” Id.
91
Entire volumes could be filled to recount the various decisions and commentaries
on the definition of manipulation and how it should be applied. Confusion notwithstanding, the Supreme Court has still refused to certify this issue as of the date of this writing.
Id. at 1239 (noting that the closest the Court came to a definitional standard was in Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), in which the Court found
an implied right of action for manipulation under the Act but failed to define the term
itself).
92
See supra Part I.B.1–2 (recounting the CFTC’s three claims of manipulation under
the CEA against Barclays).
93
See 3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1237, 1239.
94
CHISHOLM, supra note 85, at 1.
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Courts typically ask, as an initial matter, whether manipulation
actually or could have produced “artificial” prices.95 This prong
presents the most difficult obstacle because price artificiality is inherently an intensely complex question of economic analysis.96 Courts,
many of which have fairly opposing views on determining price artificiality,97 will surely probe this point in litigation98 because price artificiality is viewed as “the sine qua non of manipulation.”99 The
traditional method, as employed in financial engineering, largely relies on prices and conditions in similar or underlying markets to determine prices of the instruments in question. For example, courts
may compare the prices at issue with those from a past time period
with similar market conditions100 or with those of the underlying assets.101 Additionally, as plaintiffs in private Libor litigation have done,
prices in question may be compared to rates, spreads, or prices of
related instruments with comparable historical movements.102
These methods, however, are problematic. First, the Commission
would have to somehow compare Libor to another similar reference
rate or underlying spread, which would be exceedingly difficult and
circular given the fact that all reference interest rates or underlying
rates are in theory perceived estimates, meaning that their “true” value
is almost impossible to discern (or nonexistent). For example, Libor
fluctuates depending on the submitting banks’ financial health and
condition, which in turn is largely dependent on the market’s perception of these banks’ health. Some parties, including the city of Baltimore in its antitrust action against Barclays and other banks, have
95

In re Soybean Futures Litig., 892 F. Supp. 1025, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
See Craig Pirrong, Commodity Market Manipulation Law: A (Very) Critical Analysis and a
Proposed Alternative, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 945, 965 (1994).
97
Ind. Farm Bureau Coop. Ass’n, [1982–1984 Transfer Binder] Comm. Fut. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 21,796 (Dec. 17, 1982) (discussing extensively the weaknesses of the various measures of price artificiality).
98
See, e.g., Gen. Foods Corp. v. Brannan, 170 F.2d 220, 223 (7th Cir. 1948) (finding
against the government in a futures manipulation case, partly because the government
failed to produce expert testimony establishing that the price of rye futures was artificial
due to manipulation).
99
Pirrong, supra note 96, at 960.
100
E.g., Great W. Food Distribs., Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476, 482–84 (7th Cir. 1953)
(comparing the “spread relationship” of different egg futures contracts over an extended
period of time).
101
E.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1156–58 (8th Cir. 1971) (comparing
wheat futures contracts); see also United States v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 420 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that “[f]undamentally, markets are information
processing systems” and that a “market price is only as real as the data that inform the
process of price discovery”).
102
Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 17–41, In re Libor-Based Fin.
Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 2012) (comparing the Eurodollar spread with Libor in a time series to argue manipulation because the
typical static comparability between the two rates was skewed during the time the alleged
manipulation took place).
96
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argued that other financial instruments that closely track Libor may
serve as proxy benchmarks.103 The contention assumes that historical
empirical correlation implies a predictive relationship between the
Eurodollar bid rate and Libor, which is quite reasonable.104 The issue, however, is that opposing banks can easily argue that the relationship suffers from foresight bias; while the Eurodollar rate can be a
good predictor of what Libor will be in the future based on past data
points, the fact that future Libor does not actually comport with the
prediction does not imply it is “inaccurate,” only that some factor has
created a skew.105 Indeed, a number of reasons can explain such a
shift, including a change in regional credit conditions or adverse news
from a certain global sector.
In addition, the Commission faces the powerful argument that if,
for a given Libor fix, an accused bank did not have real lending numbers, that bank must rely on estimates, the formulation of which is not
regulated. Thus, if, say, Barclays submitted abnormal numbers for a
certain fix, allegedly to benefit itself at the expense of accuracy, the
bank can argue that its lack of transactions pushed it to submit “bona
fide” estimates, which are low because of the models used.106 In this
scenario, determination of a “true” Libor price, or even just of fraud,
is even more difficult because the entire submission is based on historical data and hypothetical modeling. And this is no imagined scenario: following the recent crisis, the London interbank lending market
has all but disappeared.107 Without the benefit of precedent in this
area or real transaction data (if other London banks were engaging in
interbank lending), the Commission will have a challenging time
proving that any submission is “false” or “artificial” if no or few real
transactions even exist for comparison. Argumentation would turn to
103
Class Action Complaint for Violation of the Federal Antitrust Laws at 12–14, Baltimore v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 11-CIV-5450 (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 5, 2011). Other private
litigants have used similar rates such as the credit default swap spread on Libor-setting
banks. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint at 18–21, Berkshire Bank v. Bank of Am. Corp., No.
12-CV-5723, 2012 WL 3024769 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 25, 2012).
104
See generally Connan Snider & Thomas Youle, Does the LIBOR Reflect Banks’ Borrowing Costs? 7–9 (Apr. 2, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1569603 (affirming the relationship between Libor
and the Eurodollar rate).
105
Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 149 (noting that empirical comparisons of
Libor to benchmark rates cannot conclusively establish “the presence of a conspiracy or a
manipulation of the Libor rate”).
106
Of course, in the investigation of Barclays, incriminating e-mails surfaced that
would push against this argument. See supra text accompanying note 65. Had such e-mails
never arisen, however, the argument posed would hold much more ground.
107
John Glover, Libor, Set by Fewer Banks, Losing Status as a Benchmark, BLOOMBERG (Oct.
8, 2012, 4:58 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-08/libor-now-set-by-sixbanks-losing-status-as-a-benchmark.html (“Unsecured lending between banks—the activity
Libor is designed to reflect—has dried up as institutions increasingly demand collateral
before money changes hands or go to central banks for funds.”).
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the estimation methodology employed, which could become messy
very quickly. Further, if the Commission compared allegedly manipulated Libor fixes to a benchmark like the Eurodollar rate, defendant
banks could argue that they had no positions in the Eurodollar, obviating any conflict of interest, and that, because of other market conditions, the Eurodollar rate no longer correlates well with Libor.108 In
any case, suffice it to say that the determination of what counts as
“artificial” or “real” in the reference-rate context is intellectually arduous, fact sensitive, and theoretically incomplete.109
As if price artificiality were not already taxing enough, its complexity is compounded in Libor’s case by a more fundamental problem: reference interest rates traditionally do not have set “prices” and
do not always act as “prices”; rather, rates like Libor are used as prices
for certain financial instruments and transactions but not for
others.110 For example, Libor may act as the price for a swap contract
but not when it is used in a bank financing or student loan.111 Such a
situation poses the question of whether the CFTC can bring a case of
manipulation only with respect to the former instrument, which used
Libor as the price, and not the latter, which did not. This sort of
asymmetry would not be beneficial in the Commission’s efforts to enforce holistically against Libor manipulation because for cases in
which Libor is the price of an instrument, the Commission only has a
claim with regards to that instrument, resulting in erratic enforcement targeting.112 Although courts have historically interpreted
“price” quite broadly,113 the pervasiveness of Libor coupled with its
novelty in litigation and enforcement can militate against exclusive
reliance on case precedents in potential CFTC litigation. For exam108

See Snider & Youle, supra note 104, at 7–9.
3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1262–63.
110
As the Libor-setting banks themselves noted (quite accurately), “[t]here are no
buyers or sellers, no market, no profit, and no competition of any kind associated with the
mere reporting of rates or setting of [Libor].” Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Antitrust Claims at 3, In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments
Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. filed June 29, 2012).
111
For a list of Libor uses, see THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 44–45.
112
To elaborate, consider a typical commodity. It has one price for all items of that
commodity in any class of contract. All of the oil in one contract class only has one price,
which fluctuates according to various factors like regional supply and demand. Libor is
here and there: it is used as an interest rate for loans, a payment rate for some swaps, a
benchmark rate for corporate projects, and the list goes on. Given this fact, the Commission cannot realistically enforce against Libor manipulation by arguing that some subset of
instruments that employs Libor as the “price” were manipulated. That would be a case
against manipulation of those instruments, not Libor, because of the manner in which the
CEA is written. See supra Part I.B.2 (describing the various causes of action used by the
CFTC in the Barclays settlement order).
113
See, e.g., CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 240–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(interpreting the spreads between oil futures contracts of different months to be “prices”
under the CEA).
109
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ple, price artificiality may be determined by looking to what the price
would have been in the context of natural market forces such as supply
and demand.114 Such an analysis is incredibly open ended with Libor
because the rate is affected first by a consortium of bank borrowing
costs, which are supported by global credit conditions, which in turn
are undergirded by such myriad factors as regional lending conditions
and interest rate levels. The level of necessary abstraction is phenomenally high.
In sum, under the CEA’s traditional115 framework, it is incredibly
difficult to prove that a bank manipulated or even attempted to manipulate Libor because (a) Libor does not have an inherent price, (b)
Libor is the “price” only for certain financial instruments and transactions, and (c) Libor fixes are wholly dependent upon market perception of borrowing costs and thus proof of manipulation would have to
compare Libor to a “true” level of borrowing cost or some other relative benchmark.116
2. Fraud
Given the difficulties in configuring a manipulation case, rate rigging could very likely be characterized as fraud or fraud-based manipulation. The standard fraud provision in the CEA is section 4b, which
generally prohibits “cheat[ing] or defraud[ing] or attempt[s of either]” by “any person, in or in connection with any order to make, or
the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate
commerce or for future delivery . . . , or swap.”117 Congress has also
inserted, via Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), a new broader antifraud measure in the CEA
by way of section 6(c)(1), the consequences of which are discussed
later.118 Under both the old and new provisions, Libor manipulation
might be described as fraud because the relevant Panel banks lied
about their cost of borrowing; however, the substantive elements of
fraud here are difficult to match against the facts of rate rigging.
The rate-rigging scandal was incredibly broad; though one could
argue that the swaps traders at Barclays intended for rate rigging to
benefit certain of their outstanding swaps positions, the Commission
114

Id. at 246–47.
I use “traditional” here because recent amendments to the CEA have expanded the
CFTC’s enforcement authority under the auspices of antimanipulation and antifraud. See
infra Part III.B.2 (describing Rules 180.1 and 180.2).
116
If market participants could determine the “true” cost of borrowing, they would
not need to have a panel of banks submit their borrowing costs to produce an estimate.
Further, although Libor may not be used as a proxy for borrowing cost in certain contexts,
such as in floating-rate swap contracts, plaintiffs would still have to prove that Libor was
“incorrect” in those contexts by comparing it to another relative benchmark.
117
7 U.S.C. § 6b (2006).
118
See infra Part III.B.2.
115
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would realistically only be able to enforce against those traders, which
would be erratic enforcement.119 Also, the swaps traders’ positions
and the rate-rigging effects have several degrees of separation between
them, so causation is again a formidable issue. Specific intent poses
certain problems as well because, without special inculpatory evidence, the Commission would face difficulty proving that any bank
intended to manipulate a reference rate. The CEA’s fraud definition
also poses a definitional ambiguity. The statute prohibits fraud or
cheating in connection with a commodity, futures contract, or swap.120
But recall that Libor is not a commodity or affixed to any specific commodity, derivative, or transaction.
The Commission may find relief, however, in the fact that section
4b itself does not expressly require a transaction in connection with
the fraud before a claim can be brought,121 and section 4o, which
prohibits fraud for certain regulated entities under the CEA, does not
include language requiring any specific transactions.122 In fashioning
rate-rigging cases, then, the Commission could plausibly argue that,
although the distortion of submissions in the course of setting rates
might not have benefitted any specific transaction, submission of inaccurate or biased Libor numbers nevertheless constitutes actionable
fraud, although the CFTC would still labor to demonstrate that the
fraud was perpetrated “in connection with” some transaction or instrument.123 A final issue is that fraud requires a “material misrepresentation or omission.”124 The obvious argument, then, is that any
accused bank will contend that its Libor submission did not materially
affect Libor fixes. As this Note will show, a mixture of fraud and manipulation allegations, brought under new Commission rules, provides the answer to how the Commission should build its substantive
claim for rate rigging.125

119
But see Supplemental Consent Order Setting Judgment for Restitution and Civil
Monetary Penalty Against Defendants, CFTC v. Jade Invs. Grp. LLC, No. 11-CV-128 (W.D.
Wis. filed Nov. 17, 2011) (finding liability against the firm itself for the actions of its individual traders and employees). Of course, the CFTC here could also employ respondeat
superior, but reliance upon this measure is insufficient to establish holistic enforcement
necessary for effective deterrence.
120
3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1361 (noting that fraud must be “perpetrated in connection with a commodities-related transaction” in order to prosecuted by the
Commission (citing FDIC v. UMIC, Inc., 136 F.3d 1375 (10th Cir. 1998)).
121
Id. at 1420–21.
122
See 7 U.S.C. § 6o.
123
See CFTC v. AVCO Fin. Corp., 28 F. Supp. 2d 104, 116–17 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
124
3 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1423.
125
See infra Part III.B.2.
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B. Foundations for Commission Jurisdiction and Reach
1. Choice of Forum
To enforce against violations of the CEA involving rate rigging,
the Commission has three routes under the CEA: it may initiate administrative adjudicatory proceedings,126 bring a civil action in federal
court,127 or collaborate with prosecutors—federal, state, or local—to
prosecute violations criminally.128 Should the Commission choose to
go first to federal court, as authorized by section 6c of the CEA,129 it
may seek injunctive relief,130 a judicial award of a civil penalty of the
greater of three times the defendant’s monetary gain or $100,000 per
violation of the CEA,131 or disgorgement of profits by court order.132
Stepping back, it is worth noting that the question posed here
regards the reach of the Commission’s enforcement ability under the
CEA; thus, at first glance, how the Commission chooses to go about
enforcement procedurally is of little concern. Indeed, should the
Commission decide after investigation that a foreign bank has fraudulently manipulated Libor or some other benchmark rate, the choice
of initial forum—administrative adjudication or enforcement in federal court—only matters insofar as the Commission prefers one over
the other.133 For example, choice of forum may implicate preferences as to trial procedure134 or level of deference to findings of fact
and law on appeal.135 The value of precedent also may encourage the
Commission to lean toward one route over the other.136
126

7 U.S.C. § 9.
Id. § 13a-1; see, e.g., CFTC v. Kimberlynn Creek Ranch, Inc., 276 F.3d 187 (4th Cir.
2002); CFTC v. Vartuli, 228 F.3d 94 (2d Cir. 2000); CFTC v. Clothier, 788 F. Supp. 490 (D.
Kan. 1992).
128
7 U.S.C. § 13.
129
Id. § 13a-1.
130
Id.
131
Id. § 13a-1(d)(1).
132
See Vartuli, 228 F.3d at 98.
133
2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1078 (“When as a result of an investigation
the Commission determines that the law has been violated, it can proceed either administratively or by going to court.”).
134
For a description of trial procedure in CFTC administrative adjudications, see generally id. at 1096–120.
135
Chevron deference would extend to the Commission’s adjudications. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). With respect to
findings of fact, a reviewing court must treat the Commission’s findings as conclusive so
long as they are supported by the weight of the evidence. 7 U.S.C. § 9; see Wilson v. U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 332 F.3d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 2003); Maloley v. R.J.
O’Brien & Assocs., 819 F.2d 1435, 1440 (8th Cir. 1987). In reviewing findings of law in a
specialized area, under which Libor would presumably fall, the court should only look for a
rational basis for the Commission’s conclusions. See Wilson, 322 F.3d at 559.
136
The SEC, for example, has traditionally favored litigating section 10(b) antifraud
enforcement actions in the Second Circuit because of the wealth of advantageous precedent accrued there.
127
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Another implication of a different nature in this decision of forum is the future effect of rulemaking related to Libor or other reference rates, to be further discussed in the next Part.137 Continual
agency adjudication of cases involving fraudulent Libor manipulation
under traditional antimanipulation and antifraud precedent may be
irrational when the Commission could simply promulgate rules addressing fraudulent manipulation of Libor and similar reference rates
directly because of the fact-preclusive benefits of rulemaking going
forward.138
2. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The CEA is premised on the impact of commodities and derivatives trading on interstate commerce;139 thus, conventional interpretive logic has held that at least some foreign activity that touches upon
domestic financial markets is within the CFTC’s purview.140 When
considering the Commission’s subject-matter jurisdiction to police activities of foreign persons and entities that are either in the United
States or that have an effect on U.S. markets under the CEA, one must
look to the conduct and effects tests,141 which the CFTC adopted from
judicial precedent involving the SEC’s extraterritorial reach under the
federal securities laws.142
Under the securities laws, courts employ both tests to determine
whether they have jurisdiction to adjudicate antifraud cases that involve foreign defendants or transactions.143 Of course, should a court
decide that such jurisdiction does not lie in any given transnational
137

See infra Part III.B (discussing rulemaking as an option to curing jurisdictional

issues).
138

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
7 U.S.C. § 1a(13) (defining interstate commerce); see Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262
U.S. 1, 32–42 (1923) (upholding the Grain Futures Act of 1922, the CEA’s predecessor, on
interstate commerce grounds). On this theme, then, it is safe to conclude that from the
Act’s jurisdictional standpoint, Libor is not excluded on constitutional grounds.
140
See Jerry W. Markham, Regulation of International Transactions Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 129, 132–33 (1979); Richard B. Earls, Note, Extraterritorial Application of Fraud Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1215, 1217–18 (1984); Marcel A. Sager, Comment, Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon)
S.A.L.: The Extraterritorial Application of the Antifraud Provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act,
11 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 615, 615–16 (1985); see also Philip McBride Johnson & Michael S.
Sackheim, Long-Arm Powers for the CFTC, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1986, at 13, 13 (“[T]he
CFTC has become increasingly visible as a potential international policeman of the activities of foreign as well as domestic participants in US markets.”).
141
2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 983.
142
See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1983); Mormels v.
Girofinance, S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815, 817 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION 730–31 (rev. 5th ed. 2006); 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90,
at 985. Case law employing the two tests in actions brought under the CEA, however, has
generally called for much lower thresholds of “effect” for satisfaction of either test. See
CFTC v. Muller, 570 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1978).
143
See HAZEN, supra note 142, at 730–31 (discussing the conduct and effect tests).
139
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case, it must dismiss the case. In the context of Libor and London
banks, the effects test—directing courts to focus on the domestic effect of conduct that occurred overseas—is more appropriate for judicial application.144 However, in the Barclays case, because the swaps
traders who solicited the faulty submissions were based in New York
City,145 the conduct test may have some play as well.
The effects test requires courts to consider whether the activity
abroad caused a “substantial effect” within the United States, with
“substantial” being predicated on a number of factors.146 Though the
securities laws do not speak directly to extraterritorial reach, Congress
has tacitly endorsed the effects test because it has “accepted, over a
long period of time, broad judicial authority to define substantive
standards of . . . liability.”147 The conduct test, on the other hand,
bids courts to consider whether the fraudulent or manipulative conduct takes place in the United States, notwithstanding where the negative effects occur.148 Because rate rigging’s effects are much broader
in scope than the conduct that caused the rate rigging itself, naturally
the effects test seems more appropriate. However, insofar as conduct
can be established as occurring in the United States, the conduct test
may be used to establish jurisdiction. In any case, the ultimate analysis
for securing jurisdiction under the CEA is the same, no matter which
of the two routes one takes.149
In fashioning the original effects test for extraterritorial application of the federal securities laws, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
144
See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 208–09 (2d Cir.) (creating the effects
test), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968). The effects test was
created on the logic that one state’s jurisdiction should apply over one who fires a gun
from outside its borders and causes injury to the state’s citizens within its borders. See
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
145
Jennifer Ablan & Matthew Goldstein, LIBOR Scandal Claims New York-Based Barclays
Executive and Trader, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:57 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/libor-barclays-executive-trader-new-york-2012-9.
146
See Earls, supra note 140, at 1219–20. A number of cases have produced factors to
be weighed in evaluating substantiality of effect. See, e.g., Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475,
478 (2d Cir. 1991); Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261–62 (2d
Cir.), amended by 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1989); Des Brisay v. Goldfield Corp., 549 F.2d 133,
135–36 (9th Cir. 1977); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989–90 (2d Cir.
1975), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Schoenbaum,
405 F.2d at 208–09.
147
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 163 (2008)
(citing Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899 (2007)).
148
See Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 665 (7th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
149
The conduct test as adopted by CEA-oriented case law has its own subtleties and
wrinkles, though because the proposal laid out in Part III focuses more on the effects test,
these nuances will not be explored in detail here. For a comprehensive discussion of conduct-test case precedent, see generally Earls, supra note 140.
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Second Circuit in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook150 referred to international
law principles articulated in section 18 of the Restatement (Second)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.151 Courts have applied that test in a far-reaching manner in the years since. In Bersch v.
Drexel Firestone, Inc., the Second Circuit found section 10(b) liability
for foreign defendants under the effects test even though the actual
domestic consequences of the defendants’ actions were quite minimal.152 The litigation involved foreign and domestic plaintiff-investors, each of whom had purchased securities of a Canadian
corporation, alleging that defendant corporation made several material misrepresentations in its prospectus—or marketing document—
that plaintiffs relied upon in contemplating whether to purchase.153
Even though defendants had prepared their prospectus in Canada,
only sending several copies into the United States,154 the court found
jurisdiction under the effects test because of domestic reliance on the
prospectuses.155
A mere glance at cases involving extraterritorial violations of the
CEA’s antimanipulation provisions reveals the resemblance to their
securities-law cousins. Even so, the first case to arise, Tamari v. Bache
& Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,156 demonstrates the expansiveness of commodities-law jurisdiction as compared to securities law jurisdiction.
Tamari involved a case brought by Lebanese citizens against a Lebanese investment firm for fraudulently managing plaintiffs’ commodity
futures accounts.157 The parties’ only contacts in the United States
were defendants’ use of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange to place
futures orders,158 which had little to no detrimental domestic effects
and certainly no “substantial” effects required by the Second Circuit
in its securities antifraud jurisprudence.159 The Tamari court, undeterred, found that defendants’ mere use of domestic exchanges created sufficient domestic “effects” to confer jurisdiction.160 In so
holding, the court reasoned that any sort of fraud or manipulation on
domestic exchanges, no matter the perpetrator’s location, weakened
150

405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), aff’d in part, rev’d in part en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir.

1968).
151

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW

OF THE

UNITED STATES § 18

(1965).
152

519 F.2d 974, 988–90 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
See id. at 987–93.
154
Id. at 987.
155
Id. at 991. In so holding, however, the Second Circuit imposed a caveat by stating
that adverse effects of a general nature are insufficient to perfect jurisdiction under the
effects test. Id. at 988 (requiring a “substantial effect” on U.S. interests).
156
547 F. Supp. 309 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
157
Id. at 310.
158
Id.
159
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
160
Tamari, 547 F. Supp. at 312–13.
153
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the integrity of U.S. derivatives markets.161 The reverse of this logic is
useful in the Libor context. Whereas the Tamari scenario involved
fraudulent activity by foreign investors on domestic exchange markets,
Libor manipulation entails manipulative effects posed on virtually all
U.S. derivatives markets with the causative activity based overseas. In
both cases, the focus, or part of it, is on the integrity of domestic markets, even though the operative activity takes place in different geographic areas. Later actions brought under the CEA have relied
heavily upon Tamari’s expansive reasoning to establish extraterritorial
reach.162
The most recent judicial proclamation on the issue of transnational reach—resting in the securities antifraud realm—is Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., which concerns Australian investor-plaintiffs suing a Florida-based company under the antifraud provisions of
the federal securities laws.163 In Morrison, National Australia Bank
(NAB), purchaser-parent of HomeSide, a Florida-based mortgage servicer, cooperated with HomeSide executives in manipulating HomeSide’s financials to inflate the value of their mortgage reservicing
rights.164 After several write-downs totaling $2.2 billion on HomeSide’s financial statements in 2001, Australian NAB shareholders filed
suit in U.S. federal court.165 On appeal to the Second Circuit, the
court found subject-matter jurisdiction lacking under the conduct
test, noting that the fraud stemmed primarily from NAB’s lack of oversight, and thus the Australian shareholder-plaintiffs lacked sufficient
contacts to U.S. markets to warrant protection under the federal securities laws.166 The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that because
section 10(b) does not extend to transactions related to securities
listed on foreign exchanges, the securities laws do not apply since they
focus not on the forum of fraud but on transactions of securities in domestic settings.167 However, in so holding, the Court abandoned the
conduct and effects tests traditionally employed to determine statutory reach and instead opted for a bright-line rule: absent a clear con161

Id. at 313.
See, e.g., Cresswell v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 580 F. Supp. 55, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(finding subject-matter jurisdiction over foreign defendants on the basis of transactions
executed on U.S. exchanges).
163
130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010).
164
Id. at 2875–76.
165
Id.
166
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S.
Ct. 2869 (2010). The court gave a nod to Judge Henry Friendly’s policy rationale in formulating the conduct test, stating: “[The] United States should not be seen as a safe haven for
securities cheaters; those who operate from American soil should not be given greater
protection from American securities laws because they carry a foreign passport or victimize
foreign shareholders.” Id. at 175.
167
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878, 2884.
162
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gressional expression of a statute’s extraterritorial application, a
statute lacks extraterritorial reach.168 In addition, the Court clarified
that the question of extraterritorial reach of section 10(b)169 concerns
substantive statutory scope; that is, while subject-matter jurisdiction
pertains to the a “tribunal’s power to hear a case,”170 statutory scope
refers to whether section 10(b) may be applied extraterritorially in
granting a cause of action against foreign defendants.171 Thus, a shift
from jurisdiction to substantive statutory reach “require[s] a new Rule
12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 12(b)(1) conclusion”—dismissal.172
Following Morrison, there has yet to be a commodities case
brought under the auspices of extraterritoriality, so the reach of section 10(b) precedent, which historically has been mirrored in the
commodities arena, is unclear. Moreover, in the context of Libor,
even a conduct-test approach or the bright-line transactional approach in Morrison has only tangential influence because the negative
conduct occurs before any effects appear within U.S. borders, though
in Barclays’s case, the negative conduct stemming from London offices derived from requests by New York office swaps traders. Finally,
Congress compounded interpretive issues by inserting an extraterritoriality provision, section 929P(b), for the securities (but not commodities) laws into Dodd-Frank just weeks after the Supreme Court handed
down the Morrison decision in 2010.173 In a nutshell, this provision
amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934174 (Exchange Act) by
conferring exclusive jurisdiction to U.S. district courts over extraterritorial securities fraud, effectively overruling at least part of the Morrison holding.175 But confusion abounds. The statutory language only
168

Id. at 2884.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
170
Union Pac. R.R. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S. Ct. 584, 596 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
171
Genevieve Beyea, Morrison v. National Australia Bank and the Future of Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Securities Laws, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 537, 546–47 (2011). A “merits
issue” concerns the substantive limits or reach of a particular statute. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at
2877 (“But to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what conduct § 10(b) prohibits,
which is a merits question. . . . It presents an issue quite separate from the question
whether the allegations the plaintiff makes entitle him to relief.” (citations omitted)).
172
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
173
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864–65 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77v(a), 78aa (Supp. IV 2010)).
174
Pub. L. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp
(Supp. IV 2010)).
175
Dodd-Frank inserted its amendments at section 27(b) of the Exchange Act, reading
in relevant part:
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district courts of
the United States and the United States courts of any Territory shall have
jurisdiction of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions
of this title involving—
169
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appears to affirm Morrison’s second holding, which confers subjectmatter jurisdiction on district courts over some extraterritorial antifraud cases, and thus remains silent on the contested holding, which
forbids section 10(b) to reach certain extraterritorial matters on the
merits. That is to say, plaintiffs’ claim in Morrison failed because the
Court did not read section 10(b) as a substantive cause of action to
reach defendants based on the failure of their activity to satisfy the
conducts test; jurisdiction in the traditional sense is not implicated.
It remains unclear how and to what extent Morrison, section
929P(b), and what remains of the conduct and effects tests impact
domestic enforcement of the CEA against Libor rigging. Congress,
with its keen interest in deterring future Libor manipulations,176
would seem to prefer some sort of extension of section 929P(b) to aid
in commodities antimanipulation. Many have argued in private Libor
litigation that the CEA is included in Morrison’s “transactional” test in
that the Act only extends to domestic commodities and their transactions.177 Such a reading completely abrogates the conduct and effects
tests for CEA actions, imputes congressional intent to restrict extraterritorial CEA application, and implies that Libor is not a commodity
under the CEA because it cannot be used to achieve extraterritorial
application of the Act. In sum, before a court can ever reach the merits of a CFTC Libor case, it must determine whether the CEA may be
applied extraterritorially to reach Libor and its fixers.
C. The Merits of Holistic Enforcement
The preceding analysis demonstrated the perplexing nature of
Libor and the unstable state of the CFTC’s extraterritorial jurisdiction. Before introducing remedial options, however, I will explain
why change is necessary. Recall that in Barclays’s case, the CFTC had
fairly strong evidence that the bank had violated U.S. commodities
laws.178 The Commission also has not had difficulty getting other
Panel banks to settle Libor charges. In addition, the CFTC may be
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes significant
steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (Supp. IV 2010)).
176
See Ben Protess, Geithner Faces Senate on Rate-Rigging Scandal, DEALB%K (July 26,
2012, 12:29 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/26/geithner-faces-senate-onrate-rigging-scandal/.
177
Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
the Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ Claims at 6–7, In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust
Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 27, 2012).
178
See supra Part I.B.2.
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able to use the imperfect manipulation and fraud provisions in the
CEA to at least catch some rate riggers. For example, while the CFTC
may not be able to capture all rate rigging because Libor is currently
neither expressly enumerated as a commodity under the CEA nor as a
per se price for those derivatives and transactions that reference Libor, the CFTC can at least drum up a legitimate fraud or manipulation case against certain banks whose rate-rigging activities are directly
linked to instruments or transactions with discrete U.S. impact (satisfying the effects test and presumably Morrison as well) and which are
caused, at least in part, by communications from U.S.-based swaps
traders (satisfying the conduct test). The point is, why all the fuss?
While the CEA and the rules thereunder provide for certain relief, they are distinctly insufficient for realization of holistic enforcement.
Merely targeting individual rate riggers in a piecemeal fashion shares
the same problematic characteristics that plagued pre-Dodd-Frank enforcement and regulation of the intricate and complex derivatives
markets: they are both post hoc and ad hoc. For example, proving
intent and price artificiality in fraud or manipulation cases is inherently fact-bound, meaning that any enforcement approach must be ad
hoc to adapt to different fact settings. At essence, holistic enforcement accomplishes two broad goals. First, such a scheme would provide the CFTC with clearly defined authority under the CEA to react
quickly to market phenomena that have been taken advantage of,
such as Libor, and that cause problems on their own. For example, as
I propose in the next Part, including within the CEA’s definition of
commodity the term “reference rate” or “Libor” gives the CFTC broad
authority to bring enforcement actions against any rate rigging, wherever it should occur or stem from. Second, the CFTC would be able to
engage in fact-preclusive rulemaking to clarify its substantive enforcement ability.
The law often struggles to keep pace with the new transactions,
products, and entities that are generated almost on a daily basis because of the law’s need to balance parochialism with market freedom.
For example, an entire “shadow banking” system had been slowly
growing up until the financial crisis, whose systemic implications regulators failed to catch until it was too late.179 Libor is no different. In
this day and age, many financial machinations do not fit into the neat
buckets that the CEA traditionally holds. Congress recognized this
fact in providing an incredibly broad definition of “swaps” in Dodd-

179
Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking 1–2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 458, 2012) (describing shadow banking as the unregulated system that financial institutions, primarily banks, use to intermediate capital in lieu of the traditional capital intermediation process).
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Frank,180 permitting the CFTC and SEC to capture as many of these
innovative instruments as possible within their new Dodd-Frank
regulations.
Like swaps, Libor represents a pervasive phenomenon—the reference or index rate—of the modern financial age that defies traditional categorization. Libor is used as a benchmark rate of interbank
borrowing but also as the “price” for trillions of financial products; it
is employed transnationally and in many different contexts—ranging
from local bank loans to complex, structured transactions between financial institutions and multinational corporations.181 As such, with
the current statutory framework for antimanipulation and antifraud
in the CEA, the CFTC has no choice but to enforce against Libor and
similar reference rates in a piecemeal fashion, creating ad hoc, post
hoc oversight and enforcement. For example, if a bank is caught rate
rigging to benefit derivatives positions and maintain stronger financial
health, the CFTC can prosecute the former but not the latter. And if
it surfaces later that other banks were involved, the CFTC can prosecute them as well. In each instance, the Commission is constrained by
antiquated law.
Such an incrementalist approach is simply insufficient to achieve
widespread deterrence and enforcement, and it surely does not serve
to maintain the integrity of evolving financial markets, whose pervasive instrumentalities, like Libor and swaps, must be structurally sound
to retain their beneficial effects (i.e., efficient risk allocation for swaps
and accurate benchmarking for Libor). Indeed, U.K. regulators have
also come to a similar conclusion, advocating for amendments to their
financial laws to explicitly include Libor manipulation as criminal conduct such that “the scope of the [new] provision for benchmark[ ]
[rates] is consistent with the scope of market manipulation of financial instruments.”182 Without a fundamental change in the law to accommodate these nebulous innovative phenomena, the CFTC simply
has no other choice. With these justifications in mind, the next Part
relays a holistic reconciliation process for domestic oversight over
Libor.
III
TOWARD HOLISTIC ENFORCEMENT
While holistic enforcement and a shift from incrementalism are
both well and good, the task of extraterritorially enforcing Libor is
daunting to say the least. The CFTC must not only surpass the substantive and jurisdictional hurdles detailed in the previous Part but
180
181
182

Dodd-Frank Act, § 721.
See supra Part I.A.
THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 18–19.

R
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also carefully tread a precedential path to be prepared to combat future fraudulent manipulations of Libor and its cousin reference rates.
At present, the Commission’s armada is ill defined at best. Should
U.S. authorities fail to deliver any significant threat against Libor fixers, the stage is all but set for repeat performances because “[t]he
methods and techniques of manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”183
The present Part proposes a two-part option that can pave the
way for greater CFTC presence in policing Libor and similar reference
interest rates. The first part preserves the pre-Morrison conduct and
effects test for actions brought under the commodities laws against
foreign defendants who attempt to manipulate or defraud using reference rates. I argue that the conduct and effects tests, not the brightline test set forth in Morrison, should govern whether the CEA substantively reaches extraterritorial manipulations to provide the CFTC with
a cause of action.184
The second part of the option rounds out the Morrison issue and
buttresses the substantive case against rate rigging by proposing that
(a) Congress amend the CEA to enshrine in its “commodity” definition Libor and other similar reference rates and (b) the Commission
promulgate rules interpreting manipulation and fraud in the reference-rate context. In regards to Morrison’s bright-line rule, if Libor is
made a statutory commodity, then the CFTC can satisfy the Morrison
test by establishing that Congress intended for the CEA to reach reference-rate manipulation that causes detrimental effects in the United
States (i.e., satisfaction of the effects test), especially given Congress’s
implicit intent to convey extraterritorial jurisdiction to the SEC via
section 929P(b) and Congress’s interest in curbing rate rigging.185
As for the substantive rate-rigging case, a statutory amendment
would grant the Commission ex ante rulemaking authority to enact
regulations regarding Libor policing, permitting the Commission to
refine its enforcement powers over fraud and manipulation as enunciated in the CEA to better capture Libor and related reference interest
rates. Though the CEA’s commodity definition is already broad, express statutory amendment or even ex ante interpretation by rulemak183
Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971). U.K. regulators have
come to a similar conclusion, noting that a credible reference rate is “subject to credible
oversight” and that “a credible governance and regulation structure should have sufficient
independence and powers to ensure that attempted manipulation . . . does not occur.” THE
WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 56 (emphasis added).
184
But see Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss the Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ Claims, supra note 177, at 4–6 (arguing exactly the
opposite—that the CEA is covered by Morrison and thus must abide by its new transactional
test to determine substantive statutory scope).
185
See Protess, supra note 176 (noting that “Congress [has] intensified its focus on the
interest-rate rigging scandal”); see infra Part III.A.

R
R

R
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ing would be preferable to arguing in actual litigation that Libor is a
commodity, as many private litigants have already done.186
A. Clarifying the Commodity Futures Trading Commission’s
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The last Part’s discussion of jurisdiction left off with the question
of whether Morrison and section 929P(b) can be reconciled with preserving conduct- and effects-test jurisdiction for CFTC claims against
foreign rate-riggers. As the Morrison Court stated, the question of section 10(b)’s reach is one of substantive merit, not subject-matter jurisdiction,187 and the lack of statutory endorsement of extraterritorial
application belies congressional intent to preclude such application.188 However, not all of the Justices agreed with such a reading of
the Exchange Act, which houses section 10(b). In his concurrence,
Justice John Paul Stevens questioned the merit of complete elimination of the conduct and effects tests along with their decades of established Second Circuit jurisprudence.189 He noted the irrationality of
clearly demarcating when extraterritorial jurisdiction applies and
when it does not, advocating for the flexible standard in place prior to
Morrison.190 To demonstrate, Justice Stevens posed a hypothetical situation in which a U.S. investor purchases common shares listed on a
foreign exchange of a corporation whose New York subsidiary engages
in fraud.191 Under the new transactional test outlined by the majority
in Morrison, the investor has relief in section 10(b) because there was
no purchase or sale of a security domestically even though “there is
both substantial wrongful conduct . . . in the United States and a substantial injurious effect on United States markets and citizens.”192
In further advocating against the majority’s bright-line rule, Justice Stevens pointed out that, though a presumption against extraterritoriality underlies the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,193 the Court
must “give effect to ‘all available evidence about the meaning’ of a provision when considering its extraterritorial application,” overcoming
186
See, e.g., Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 102, at 96 (“LIBOR acts just as any other commodity . . . .”).
187
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010).
188
Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., concurring).
189
Id. at 2891.
190
Id. at 2891–92.
191
Id. at 2895.
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258 (1991) (“Congress’ awareness of the need to make a clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the extraterritorial
application of a statute.”).

R
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the presumption when no clear statutory directive exists.194 He further argued that the presumption carries little weight in consideration
of section 10(b)’s extraterritorial applicability because the presumption is a “tool for managing international conflict” and a “tiebreaker”;
courts still retain authority to faithfully interpret statutes.195 Because
the Second Circuit’s effects test adheres to the Exchange Act’s purpose of capturing overseas fraudulent activity with detrimental effects
in the United States, it comports with Congress’s understanding of the
Act.196
The logic in Justice Stevens’s arguments should carry special
weight under the CEA. Fundamentally, much of the reasoning in
Morrison does not fit the situation created by Libor, in part due to
Libor’s defiance of traditional categorization.197 Though securities
are offered on a cross-border basis and companies can list on exchanges of multiple countries, derivatives transcend borders by affecting markets as a whole.198 This characteristic stems from the fact that
derivatives markets exist to permit market participants to transfer risk
or profit from proprietary information on risk fluctuations.199 Take
the futures market as an example. The trading of futures contracts
does not affect any one company or investor per se, yet it can affect
the prices of all futures contracts of its kind in the given market as well
as the underlying market for the commodity upon which the futures
contracts are written.200
Moreover, it is well established in the financial literature that the
price of one type of derivative—say, an interest-rate swap—can be directly influenced by the prices of other derivatives because many
prominent pricing models employed by market participants use the
194
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2891 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Sale v. Haitian Ctrs.
Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 177 (1993)).
195
Id. at 2892.
196
Id. at 2888–91; see Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326,
1336 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 14, 19 (2007). Domestic effects as a proxy for necessity of extraterritorial
reach has been prevalently employed in other contexts as well. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 705 (1962); Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986
F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that the presumption against extraterritoriality loses
strength “when the [relevant] conduct . . . occurs within the United States” and failure to
extend extraterritoriality “will result in adverse effects within the United States”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 38 (1965).
197
See supra Part II.C.
198
See generally DEUTSCHE BÖRSE GRP., THE GLOBAL DERIVATIVES MARKET: AN INTRODUCTION passim (2008) (describing the global nature and function of derivatives).
199
Id.
200
Additionally, the commodities markets, and thus their attendant derivatives markets, are substantially subject to the whims of global supply and demand. See GARY L.
SEEVERS, REPORT OF THE COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF CONTRACT MARKETS 24–27 (1976).
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prices of simpler derivatives to value more complex derivatives.201 For
example, the standard interest-rate swap entails one party paying a
fixed rate and receiving from its counterparty a floating rate.202 To
determine what the rates (the price) should be, the swap itself can be
broken down into several futures contracts, which are much easier to
value due to their simplistic term structures. Evidently, then, derivatives and commodities markets possess much greater fluidity and interconnectedness, a phenomenon recognized early on by the Tamari
court in its finding that the integrity of domestic exchange markets
are worthy of protection from extraterritorial deceit and fraud even
where limited domestic contacts exist.203 A bright-line purchase or
sale transactional test simply does not comport with the underlying
economics of commodities and derivatives markets.204
In July 2010, Congress—in its sweeping reform of financial markets—passed section 929P(b) of Dodd-Frank to rebut Morrison’s holding and presumption against extraterritoriality for section 10(b)
antifraud cases brought by the SEC or the Justice Department.205 Notwithstanding the language confusion in section 929P(b),206 it appears
that Congress intended to restore the conduct and effects tests for
201
See generally HULL, supra note 5, at 75 (describing interest rates and how they are a
factor in the valuation of all derivatives).
202
See supra notes 66, 85 and accompanying text (describing interest rate swaps).
203
Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 547 F. Supp. 309, 313 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(“[W]here the challenged transactions involve trading on domestic exchanges, harm can
be presumed, because the fraud alleged implicates the integrity of the American market.”).
Other courts have also pondered the question of how much deference courts should extend to the international scope of commodities transactions. See, e.g., Mormels v.
Girofinance, S.A., 544 F. Supp. 815, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
204
Plaintiffs in private Libor litigation argued, to similar effect, that Morrison’s application to Libor claims under the CEA generates the inquiry of “where the underlying [derivatives] contracts were actually traded.” The Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of
Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Exchange-Based Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 33, In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig.,
No. 1:11-md-2262-NRB (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 28, 2012) (citing CFTC v. Garofalo, No. 10 Civ.
2417, Rec. Doc. 83, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2010)). Because the Libor-based contracts
being traded by the various banks’ swaps traders, including those at Barclays, were ultimately executed on U.S. exchanges, plaintiffs argue that Morrison’s transactional test is
satisfied. Id. Such an argument on its face is perfectly sufficient for this case; however, it
fails in the holistic enforcement regard because one can imagine a variety of plausible
scenarios in which Libor manipulation was not in fact tethered to any specific transaction
or transactions. Additionally, if the manipulation in these hypotheticals only partially implicated contracts traded on U.S. exchanges, courts would have to engage in line drawing
to determine what threshold percentage of such transactions would have to be executed in
the United States before sufficient contacts rest domestically. Such line drawing is the
antithesis of a holistic approach to enforcement against Libor rigging.
205
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929P(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 (2010) (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78aa (Supp IV. 2010)); see 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul Kanjorski) (clearly noting the intention of section 929P(b)).
206
Though the Supreme Court in Morrison addressed the lack of substantive statutory
merit to hear the extraterritorial case, the language in Dodd-Frank grants the SEC and
Justice Department subject-matter jurisdiction. Read literally, the Dodd-Frank language is

R
R
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agency antifraud actions under the federal securities laws on both subject-matter jurisdiction and substantive statutory scope grounds. Indeed, the SEC has taken this view and has initiated rulemaking
congruent with restored conduct and effect tests.207 Justice Stevens
would also likely advocate for this reading given his arguments that
the conduct and effects tests should not be affected by the presumption against extraterritoriality endorsed by Morrison’s majority. Assuming that the Court confirms this reading of section 929P(b),208 later
courts in commodities actions brought by the CFTC should read DoddFrank’s restoration of extraterritoriality purposively as warranting the
same treatment in such actions by interpreting Morrison as not applying to the CEA given the differences between the securities and derivatives markets. At a minimum, section 929P(b) comports with the
historical and economic understanding that derivatives markets transcend national borders in a more fluid manner than securities markets, as exemplified in the previous paragraph.
Finally, at its core, Morrison instructs courts to observe the focus of
congressional intent when deciding whether a statute may be used to
reach extraterritorially.209 Thus, the Morrison Court noted that because section 10(b) of the Exchange Act focused on purchases and
sales of securities in the United States, the “transactional test” forecloses section 10(b) from reaching overseas to an Australian bank
when the securities sales occurred overseas as well.210 The Court further distinguished “interstate commerce” from “foreign commerce,”
remarking that mention of the former does not imply inclusion of the
latter to defeat the presumption against extraterritorial application.211
But as I noted before, the derivatives markets are uniquely fluid in
global scope; thus, manipulation and fraud of such markets can vary
in effect, from regional to international, more so than in the companion securities markets. Indeed, Dodd-Frank itself is partially premised
on the need for international standardization of derivatives market resuperfluous since subject-matter jurisdiction is presumably already conferred upon the
SEC to bring these sorts of actions.
207
See, e.g., Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,822 (Oct.
29, 2010).
208
Indeed, many commentators have already endorsed the SEC’s interpretation of
section 929P(b) and have placed their bets with the agency in the event of litigation over
the provisions. See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 195, 206–08 (2011) (discussing the SEC’s interpretation of section 929P(b) and arguments the agency could make in
support of its interpretation).
209
See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010) (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”’”
(quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))).
210
See id. at 2874.
211
See id. at 2873–74.
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form, and in investigating Libor, authorities forthrightly affirmed the
need for international cooperation.212 It follows, then, that certain
subject areas covered by the CEA that have substantial U.S. effects
should permit the statute to have extraterritorial reach; to hold otherwise would be to strip the CEA of any power whatsoever given the
transnational nature of derivatives markets. In today’s continuously
evolving global markets, strict Morrison-type limitations on extraterritorial application of the CEA would be nothing less than arbitrary. Instead, if a derivatives-related manipulation or fraudulent scheme such
as rate rigging produces substantial effects in the United States, Morrison’s bright-line wall should fall away to permit extraterritorial access
for the CFTC.
B. Libor’s Place in the Commodity Exchange Act
Aside from the post-Morrison restoration of the conduct and effects tests, two issues remain: first, the CFTC may still face substantive
statutory scope issues because defendants can still use Morrison to argue that, notwithstanding any restoration of the effects test for CEA
actions, the CEA still does not reach reference-rate manipulation; second,
the CFTC must contend with the difficulty in establishing a prima facie case in Libor litigation. Approaches to the second issue can take
many forms. For example, some private claimants have gone the antitrust route.213 Others, figuring that Libor is embedded in many securities, have sued directly under the federal securities laws.214 Litigants
have also argued that, given the broad definition of “commodity,” Libor and similar reference rates are already captured in the definition.215 But these more treacherous avenues can all be scrapped in
favor of a much more unassuming, foundational option: Congress
should explicitly make Libor—or any reference rate for that matter—
a commodity.216
212
See AM. BANKERS ASS’N, DODD-FRANK AND COMMUNITY BANKS: YOUR GUIDE TO 12
CRITICAL ISSUES 2 (2012), http://www.aba.com/aba/documents/dfa/dfguide.pdf (noting
that that one of the intentions behind the Dodd-Frank Act was “to harmonize U.S. regulations with international standards, and even exceed them”).
213
See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 102, ¶¶ 1–8. The
CFTC actually does possess some antitrust authority that it may exercise in conjunction
with administering the CEA. Essentially, the CFTC is tasked with weighing antitrust concerns with its own regulatory needs. See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 1223 (citing
SENATE AGRIC. & FORESTRY COMM., REPORT ON H.R. 13,113, S. REP. NO. 93-1131, at 22–23,
90 (2d Sess. 1974)). However, much of this inquiry pertains to rulemaking decisions, not
enforcement, since the latter would presumably run parallel with, not against, antitrust
concerns.
214
See Class Action Complaint ¶¶ 147–56, Gusinsky v. Barclays PLC, No. 12-CV-5329,
2012 WL 2775017 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 10, 2012).
215
See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 102, passim.
216
U.K. regulators, as mentioned earlier, have advocated for a similar result, requesting that Libor manipulation be codified as a specific prosecutable offense in their financial laws
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1. Classification of Reference Rates as Commodities
While the Commission has the authority to prevent manipulation
and fraud in the marketplace, it also has express plenary authority
over all enumerated commodities in the CEA.217 In enacting the
CEA, Congress defined “commodity” in section 1a(9) as follows:
wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats, barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums,
mill feeds, butter, eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool,
wool tops, fats and oils, . . . cottonseed meal, cottonseed, peanuts,
soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen
concentrated orange juice, and all other goods and articles, . . . and
all services, rights, and interests . . . in which contracts for future
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.218

The phrase “contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future
dealt in” expands the commodity definition to include all items and
assets that underlie traded futures contracts.219 The piecemeal format
of the definition does not imply a form-based approach to determining what is and is not a commodity; the Commission has consistently
taken the position that determination of commodity status considers
economic reality.220 On its face, because certain futures contracts are
traded on interest rates, the CFTC could conceivably take a productbased approach in capturing Libor; indeed, private litigants have
taken the approach that defendant banks manipulated the Eurodollar
futures price and its underlying commodity: Libor.221 Again, however, such an approach falters for the CFTC not due to lack of statutory blessing but because the approach fails to produce holistic
results. In the Barclays case, for example, interest rate futures were at
best only partially implicated. Should a bank manipulate reference
to ensure that they holistically capture rate rigging. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4,
at 18–19. Indeed, U.K. regulators expressly reject the notion of simply expanding regulators’ enforcement powers and prefer explicitly making Libor manipulation an offense. See
id. at 18.
217
See 2 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 976–77; David J. Gilberg, Regulation of New
Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1599,
1601–03 (1986).
218
7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2006).
219
It could be argued that Libor might fall within this leg of the definition since many
swaps, which theoretically can be decomposed into multiple futures contracts, employ Libor as the rate at which payments are exchanged. Though this interpretation would most
likely fail in the judicial context, it nevertheless serves to illustrate the potential flexibility
of the commodity definition in the face of evolving financial markets.
220
1 JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 90, at 9.
221
See, e.g., The Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Exchange-Based Amended Consolidated Class Action
Complaint at 5–8, In re Libor-Based Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., No. 1:11-md-2262NRB (S.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 28, 2012) (arguing that Barclays intentionally manipulated Libor
levels to gain favorable prices in some of its swaps traders’ Eurodollar contracts).
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rates but not have positions in any relevant futures contract or derivative instrument, this route would falter.
The commodity definition further excludes certain items, including any:
interest rate, . . . other rate, . . . index . . . not based in substantial
part on the value of a narrow group of commodities . . . or based
solely on 1 or more commodities that have no cash market . . . , [or]
any economic . . . index based on prices, rates, values, or levels that
are not within the control of any party to the relevant contract,
agreement, or transaction.222

The CEA, by amendment from the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (CFMA),223 also exempts commodities that are not “excluded
commodit[ies] or . . . agricultural commodit[ies].”224 Though excluded commodities, which notably include “interest rates,” are not
covered by many of the CEA’s and CFTC’s regulatory provisions,
they—along with exempt commodities—remain subject to the CFTC’s
general antimanipulation and antifraud authority.225
Several arguments militate against Libor being a commodity.
First, one can differentiate an “interest rate,” contained in the excluded commodity definition, from an “index rate”: Libor serves many
more purposes than simply being an interest rate. It is employed as a
benchmark for all sorts of financial instruments and is an indicium of
bank borrowing costs, which has implications for alternative uses.
Though “price” is interpreted fairly broadly by courts,226 a court may
hesitate in finding all uses of Libor to be prices, even if the court
agrees that Libor is an excluded commodity. Further, a court may not
even get that far, finding that Libor is simply too nebulous or has too
many uses in the markets to be considered an interest rate. Finally,
even if a court found the other way, the CFTC would still face challenges in bringing future enforcement cases on this one piece of precedent alone and in promulgating rules under the excluded
commodity provision to bolster its enforcement power. Further,
banks have argued in private Libor litigation that Libor is a “hypothetical” number subject to much discretion.227
222

7 U.S.C. § 1a(19).
Commodity Futures Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000)
(codified in scattered sections of titles 7, 11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
224
7 U.S.C. § 1a(20).
225
JERRY W. MARKHAM, COMMODITIES REGULATION: FRAUD, MANIPULATION & OTHER
CLAIMS ch. 27 (2012).
226
See, e.g., Memorandum and Order at 11, 17–22, CFTC v. Parnon Energy Inc., No.
11 Civ. 3543 (WHP) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2012) (finding that the spread in a calendar spread
trade involving sweet light crude futures can be a “price” for manipulation purposes).
227
See The Exchange-Based Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss the Exchange-Based Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 221, at 8 (citing Defendant’s Brief at 27 n.25).
223

R
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The foregoing arguments notwithstanding, congressional endorsement of Libor and other reference rates as statutory commodities would almost be formalistic given how closely reference rates
already resemble commodities. First, recall that excluded commodities, which include interest rates, are simply excluded by the CFMA
from certain of the CFTC’s and CEA’s rules and provisions, yet the
CFTC retains antifraud and antimanipulation authority over them.
Second, Libor reflects all of the essentials present in what one might
depict as a “true” commodity. Libor is tied to endless amounts of derivative instruments around the world and makes transparent what
baseline costs of borrowing are in the financial markets on a daily
basis.228 As with other commodities, the cost of borrowing fluctuates
depending on a plethora of factors, including the state of the global
economy, the idiosyncrasies attendant to each currency fix, the risk
and volatility of the various markets (money, security, and derivative)
shown through the different maturities, and others.229 In other
words, in this light, Libor begins to look like any other commodity
that neutrally responds to the ebb and flow of global markets.
Further, the results of the calculation are broadly disseminated
and incorporated into market transactions around the globe. Information consumption of this kind cycles through the markets and,
eventually, the information makes its way back into bank borrowing
costs by affecting market perceptions of what borrowing costs should
be. Finally, market participants interact heavily using Libor as a
method of communicating views on risk and market conditions (i.e.,
price information). In this vein, Libor acts as the “price” for any instrument that employs Libor or some other reference rate because the
price of an instrument includes not only the stated payment rates but
also their underlying components.230 Thus, for those instruments and
contracts that employ a price tethered or related in some way to bank
borrowing cost or some other market benchmark, the CFTC could
contend that the relevant reference rate benchmark is included in
that price. Indeed, the CFTC has taken the position in the past that
Libor rates are commodities under the CEA.231
228
See Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 12 (“$90 trillion in dollar-denominated
mortgage loans, corporate debt and financial contracts rise and fall according to Libor’s
movements.”).
229
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 30, at 13 (noting that risk of lending money depends on “the issuer’s financial condition, industry segment, and conditions in that industry and economic variables and intangibles”).
230
See Memorandum and Order, supra note 226, at 17–21 (noting that in determining
an artificial price, “one must look to the broadest possible range of relevant cash market
transactions” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
231
Settlement Order, supra note 10, at 4, 11, 25–27 (“[T]he daily BBA LIBOR for U.S.
Dollar, Sterling, and Yen [are] . . . all commodities in interstate commerce . . . .”); see In re
DiPlacido, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 30970, 2008 WL 4831204, at *31 (Nov. 5, 2008)
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2. A Full Trip: Realization of Holistic Enforcement
Once Congress amends the CEA to include “reference rate” in
the commodity definition, the CFTC can effectively circumvent the
Morrison merits question to prepare a substantive case against any rate
manipulation or fraud.232
With satisfaction of the effects test and characterization of Libor
as a commodity, the CFTC should survive a motion to dismiss brought
under Morrison because under Justice Stevens’s reasoning in his concurrence, the Tamari rationale, the definitional and economic transnationalism of derivatives markets, and implied congressional vision
of harmonized global derivatives regulation (through its enactment of
section 929P(b) and Dodd-Frank), the CEA can be said to extraterritorially reach foreign reference rates and their fixers. Inclusion of Libor as a commodity in the CEA is crucial here because although the
CFTC could potentially successfully argue that Morrison should not apply in rate-rigging litigation, inclusion solidifies the argument by specifically pointing to the very thing that caused the substantial effects
(shown through the restored effects test) on domestic interests.
To circumvent these complications, the Commission, once statutorily vested with oversight over Libor, can and should promulgate
rules and regulations to help it prove a Libor-based fraudulent manipulation claim. Congress has taken the first step already in its enactment of Dodd-Frank, which includes a new broad prohibition against
fraud and market manipulation, modeled after section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act: section 6(c)(1) of the CEA.233 Section 6(c)(1) prohibits any “manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in the derivatives markets,234 which expands the CFTC’s authority to enforce
against manipulation and fraud in two ways: first, the CFTC now is not
limited to proving price artificiality in manipulation cases; second, the
scienter standard for both fraud and manipulation has been reduced
from intentional acts to recklessness.
Acting upon this new authority, the Commission promulgated
Rule 180.1, which models Rule 10b-5 from the securities laws.235 Rule
180.1 elaborates upon section 6(c)(1) to broadly capture intentional
(holding that an artificial price includes the calculation of an average of prices over a given
time period).
232
In Morrison, the plaintiffs lacked a cause of action because their transaction did not
fall within the scope of the Securities Act because of the lack of a “purchase or sale” of a
security within domestic borders. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2883–85 (2010).
233
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,400
(July 14, 2011) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
234
Id. at 41,401.
235
See id. at 41,400.
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or reckless fraud-based manipulations in connection with a derivative
or commodity.236 With the new rule and its “flexibl[e]” and “remedial” interpretation,237 the CFTC will not have to prove any actual effect, such as abstruse price artificiality, in manipulation cases so long
as it shows fraud.238 In addition, the CFTC promulgated Rule 180.2,
which preserves the traditional price manipulation analysis borne of
case law.239 Fundamentally, Rule 180.2 expands the traditional analysis by capturing indirect manipulations.240 Together, the two new rules
appear to have a fairly firm grasp on reference-rate manipulation:
general reference-rate manipulation is arguably “in connection with”
the various indexed instruments and contracts and would indirectly
affect market prices around the world.241
Though it is a step in the right direction, Rule 180.1 falls short of
holistic enforcement in a critical way. The CFTC has commented that
the Rule can only apply to “manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with the purchase, sale, . . . or termination of any swap, or contract of sale of any commodity . . . , or contract for future delivery.”242
The CFTC specifically pronounced that it would follow SEC precedent in formulating the transaction or instrument requirement, posing an example from SEC v. Zandford: “If . . . a broker embezzles cash
from a client’s account . . . , then the fraud would not include the
requisite connection to a purchase or sale of securities. Likewise, if
the broker . . . was stealing the client’s assets, that breach . . . would
not involve a deceptive device or fraud.”243 Thus, before the Rules
236

See id.
See id. at 41,401.
238
See id. (“A market or price effect may well be indicia of the use or employment of a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance; nonetheless, a violation of final Rule
180.1 may exist in the absence of any market or price effect.”).
239
Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 17 C.F.R. § 180.2 (2012) (“It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate the price of
any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for future delivery on or subject
to the rules of any registered entity.”).
240
Id.
241
Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Has the Libor-Alleged Conspiracy and Manipulation Inspired the
New CFTC Regulations?, GLOBAL ECON. GROUP (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.globaleconomics
group.com/financial-regulation/has-the-libor-alleged-conspiracy-and-manipulation-in
spired-the-new-cftc-regulations/.
242
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,405
(July 14, 2011) (emphasis added).
243
535 U.S. 813, 825 n.4 (2002) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); see Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85 (2006) (holding that section
10b-5 requires a nexus between fraud and a securities transaction). Although the Supreme
Court has construed the antimanipulation and antifraud provisions of the CEA broadly, see
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 836 (1986), virtually all judicial interpretations of such provisions have required a similar nexus between fraudulent or manipulative activity and a commodities or derivatives transaction or contract, see, e.g., R&W Technical Servs. Ltd. v. U.S.
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 205 F.3d 165, 171–74 (5th Cir. 2000).
237
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can be used against reference-rate manipulation, the CFTC must find
some transaction or contract to tie the manipulation to, which could
result in erratic enforcement. However, the CFTC stated that it will
interpret this language broadly—meaning the connection may be tenuous and the transaction or transactions may be unspecified.244
In light of this obstacle, the Commission should promulgate rules
beyond 180.1 and 180.2.245 First, with respect to definitions, the Commission might further define the new “reference rate” commodity
(similar to its additional definitions of “swap” in Dodd-Frank).246 In
this endeavor, the Commission can look to how U.K. regulators have
classified reference, or benchmark, rates to retain parallel regimes
with European authorities. The Wheatley Report, for example, has advocated for a broader definitional standard to capture any rate “vulnerable to similar conflicts of interest and weak governance issues that
have been identified with LIBOR.”247 On the issue of scienter, because the requisite threshold is now recklessness, the Commission
might clarify in rulemaking that at least a presumption of recklessness
can be met if certain internal controls required by U.K. authorities for
Libor-setting banks are not met by insiders, if those controls produced
red flags that management failed to heed and investigate, or if submission estimation procedures have been corrupted. Such a presumption would capture cases in which the facts were not as blatant as in
the Barclays scenario.
The Commission should particularly focus on apprehending attempted indirect manipulation of reference rate levels as commodities,
not as prices of instruments “in connection with” the manipulation.
With the abrogation of a specific intent standard, any fraud-based attempt to suppress or increase reference-rate fixes would fall under the
indirect manipulation standard of Rule 180.2 as well as the fraud standard in Rule 180.1. Because Rule 180.1 does not require a showing of
negative effect, such as price artificiality, the CFTC may argue that the
fraud artificially altered the normal “course” of a reference rate’s fixes
without proving that the price was actually artificial.
The implications here are enormous. Typically, as I mentioned
earlier, price artificiality can only be proved by comparing the alleg244
See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,406–07.
245
The Commission might further clarify just how strong the “connection” must be
between the fraud or manipulation and a transaction, as many industry members have
already requested. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. at
41,400.
246
See Further Definition of “Swap,” “Security-Based Swap,” and “Security-Based Swap
Agreement”; Mixed Swaps; Security-Based Swap Agreement Recordkeeping, 76 Fed. Reg.
29,818, 29,821–25 (May 23, 2011).
247
See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 54, 61–62.
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edly manipulated price to a “true” price, an intensely difficult endeavor considering the hefty economic analysis required as well as the
immense subtlety in proving that any deviation of the price in question from some other benchmark price was caused by fraud (as opposed to neutral market conditions or bona fide estimates) or if such
a comparison is even relevant (i.e., whether the deviation from the
benchmark even implies price artificiality).248 With the two new rules,
the CFTC can argue both on price artificiality grounds—Rule 180.2—
for an indirect manipulation claim and on a more nebulous fraudbased manipulation basis—Rule 180.1—akin to a section 10b-5 argument of general deception in the marketplace—without proving price
artificiality.
To bolster the Rule 180.1 claim, the Commission should also clarify reference-rate fraud (beyond outright fraud like that in Barclays’s
case) because, practically speaking, any reference-rate manipulation
will most likely result from fraud. There are multiple ways to do this.
For example, now that traditional price artificiality has been discarded, the Commission might adopt certain reference-rate
benchmarks, such as the Eurodollar rate and credit default swap
spread for Libor.249 Plaintiffs in private Libor litigation rely heavily on
comparative empirical analysis to prove price artificiality, using such
benchmarks as the Eurodollar rate.250 The argument goes that if Libor, which historically tracks the Eurodollar rate closely, deviates from
the Eurodollar rate, Libor must be off because the Eurodollar rate is
the result of neutral market fluctuations whereas Libor can be
manipulated more easily. Empirical comparisons suffer from certain
biases,251 and deviations or irregularities “may indeed exist in the absence of anticompetitive [or manipulative] behavior.”252 For example, a time-series regression comparing Libor fixes with comparable
credit spreads on Libor-setting banks “cannot establish the presence
of a conspiracy or a manipulation” because “there are many reasons
why significant discrepancies . . . exist between CDS [credit default

248

See supra Part II.A.I.
Many studies and analyses have already compared Libor to other benchmarks such
as the credit default swap spread for Libor-setting banks, Treasury rates, and Eurodollar
contract rates, all of which traditionally correlate closely with Libor, to “prove” that Libor is
being artificially skewed (i.e., not tracking actual market conditions). See, e.g., AbrantesMetz et al., supra note 13, at 141–50 (extending the original Wall Street Journal comparison
of Libor to the noted benchmarks to “present statistical evidence of patterns that appear to
be inconsistent with those expected to occur under conditions of [normal] market competition”); Mollenkamp & Whitehouse, supra note 12.
250
See Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, supra note 102, at 18–43.
251
See supra Part II.A.1.
252
Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 149.
249

R

R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\98-5\CRN506.txt

2013]

unknown

LIBOR INTEGRITY

Seq: 45

20-JUN-13

14:19

1315

swap] spreads and short-term borrowing costs,”253 but it does observe
“certain patterns [that] ‘flag’ such a possibility.”254
However, empirical results may be useful if the proxy instrument
is more relevant; for example, should U.K. regulators publish a regular statistical bulletin using relevant data points such as the volume
and value of interbank funding transactions, such information could
provide a picture of actual conditions of the interbank market and
serve as a comparison benchmark to elucidate deviations.255 The
CFTC might adopt this approach in rulemaking to formalize its use in
future litigation. Should the CFTC demonstrate material deviation
from those benchmarks of Libor or another rate, such as commercial
paper rates,256 then it has established a presumption of fraud-based
manipulation, rebuttable by defendant banks, which must show that
some other factor or factors caused the deviation, not fraud-based manipulation.257 Further, the CFTC might look to the procedure through
which submitting banks determine and disseminate their rates. Finally, if it comes out in discovery that an accused bank failed to adhere to such internal controls, this failure would be indicative of
possible inaccurate submissions.258
Holistic enforcement is also fulfilled if reference rates are made
and then manipulated “in connection with” commodities under Rule
180.1.259 To see why, consider a Libor-setting bank that wishes to portray itself as financially healthy and creditworthy.260 Assume also that
during this time, the interbank market is thin. Among other things,
the bank, in estimating its borrowing costs, uses more conservative inputs to arrive at a lower rate, which it submits publicly. Up to this
point, the bank has not technically employed any “deceptive device,”
253
Id. at 147 (noting, for example, that the discrepancies can be due to differences in
time horizons, segmentation effects on liquidity premia, and other uncontrolled factors).
254
Id. at 147–49 (presenting correlations between individual banks’ Libor quotes and
their credit default swap spreads).
255
See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 40.
256
See Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 150.
257
The argument underlying this treatment is not entirely new. See In re Cox, CFTC
Docket No. 75-16, 1987 WL 106879, at *12 (July 15, 1987) (recognizing that there can be
many causes of an artificial price and holding that manipulation can be argued when defendants’ acts are a proximate cause of the artificial price); see also CFTC v. Parnon Energy
Inc., 875 F. Supp. 2d 233, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (remarking that, for an attempted manipulation claim, “[i]t is enough . . . that respondents’ action contributed to the price [movement]” (quoting In re Kosuga, 19 Agric. Dec. 603, 624 (U.S.D.A. 1960))).
258
The procedures could mirror the code of conduct and submission procedures advocated by the Wheatley Report. See THE WHEATLEY REVIEW, supra note 4, at 30–33.
259
Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2012).
260
See Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 137 (noting that banks have an incentive
to submit inaccurate published rates not to influence the Libor fix but to “signal
that . . . borrowing costs are . . . no higher than those of . . . peers” and “signal . . . pricing
intentions [to peer banks]”).
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it has not been reckless, and it did not attempt to manipulate Libor
“in connection with” any transactions or derivatives, even indirectly.
Yet this is precisely one of the scenarios authorities hope to eliminate
because it destabilizes the integrity of an important financial benchmark, not because the bank will inequitably profit from such a move.
The issue here is compounded by the fact that the bank’s decision to
use conservative inputs is not entirely fraudulent; rather, on a sliding
scale from outright fraud to questionable conduct, such a decision
falls somewhere in the middle. And here, the CFTC cannot avail itself
of the aforementioned clarifying regulations that compare referencerate levels to other benchmarks for evidence of manipulation because
the bank will simply argue that, in estimating its Libor submission, it
followed protocol by using inherently subjective model inputs. However, the CFTC can solve these issues by clarifying that the reference
rate is the commodity whose level is being manipulated. Now, all the
CFTC must show is that the bank in the example set forth inaccurate
submissions based on impermissibly conservative inputs in connection
with a commodity—the reference rate itself. The deception is in the
model, and the inputs can be compared to market benchmarks.
CONCLUSION
Libor rate rigging is a dangerous externality of the increasing interconnectedness of global markets. Its effects have transcended national boundaries and permeated through the domestic
socioeconomic stratum. And it is, unfortunately, not a singular threat:
Libor and its companion reference rates have revealed the subtle
holes in the CFTC’s current enforcement toolbox. This Note encourages clarification of the domestic defenses available to financial regulators to combat the rate rigging of benchmark reference rates in the
global financial markets. Much attention in the last few years has
been focused on the credit crisis, and rightly so. But with the passage
of Dodd-Frank and the quelling of the initial panic, regulators and
legislators need to look beyond the obvious issues meriting market
reform and delve into deeper, more pervasive structural problems
that may undermine the integrity of the financial system at any time.
This Note advocated for a holistic, statutory-cum-functional enforcement approach, in lieu of a piecemeal judicial approach, to resolve deficiencies and ambiguities currently present in the statutory
and regulatory provisions governing the CFTC’s ability to handle foreign fraudulent manipulations of broad-based benchmark reference
rates such as Libor. The two-part option sponsored in this Note works
not only to address the Libor issue at hand but also to capture future
manipulations or even innocent distortions of index rates or other
nebulous financial phenomena that have transnational effects. By
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clarifying judicial treatment of extraterritorial application of commodities law jurisdiction and by solidifying Libor in the CEA or rules thereunder, whatever future financial phenomena are to come, whether in
the benchmark reference-rate realm or not, domestic watchdogs will
be much better prepared to police against improper behavior.
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